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Coordination of power projection capability is a central theme in national strategy, but it 
presents significant challenges in development. This portfolio answers the question, what 
are the challenges to coordinating the growing instruments of national power.  This 
portfolio answers this question by identifying the challenges that present themselves in 
Congress and the executive branch. This portfolio theorizes that the growth in the 
instruments of national power have led to a degree of decentralized control among US 
power projection capability that causes distinct challenges to the ability of the executive 
and congressional branch to plan and build coordinated capability. The basis for the 
argument is predicated on the theory that the US power projection capability has grown 
to incorporate a wide range of distinct instruments of national power that are used to 
meet US security objectives. Within several of the instruments of national power exist a 
host of executive departments and agencies who have independent control of their 
instrument and this requires the executive and the congressional branch to apply effective 
coordination to achieve a synchronized strategy. This portfolio examines the National 
Security Council’s efforts to plan amid a growing number of instruments of power. This 
growth challenges the structure of the National Security Council because it seeks to 
apply more decentralized capability towards strategy that requires more coordination. 
Similarly, this portfolio asserts that Congress is also challenged by the growth of the 
instruments of national power because it challenges jurisdictional limits of the 
congressional committees and its ability to affect holistic budgeting and oversight in 
support of coordinated strategy. The final chapter of this portfolio examines the 
jurisdiction and budgeting challenges in congress through a case study that focuses on 
counter terrorism strategy both in response to the 9/11 Commission report and during 
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the rise of the Islamic State to demonstrate how the execution of congressional oversight 
and budgeting challenge the coordination of the instruments of national power. Thesis 

















































This thesis portfolio is dedicated to my wife, 




I would like to acknowledge the incredible professionalism and expertise 
 of the professors at Johns Hopkins University.  































Table of Contents 
 
Abstract P. ii 
 
Table of Contents  P. v 
Introduction  P. 1 
  
Definition of Terms  
 




Chapter 1. Growth of the Instruments of National Power P. 12 
 
Chapter 2. Challenges to Coordinating DIMEFIL in the NSC P. 29 
  
Known Organizational Challenges 
 
Challenges Presented by the Expansion of DIMEFIL 
 
Chapter 3. Challenges to Coordinating DIMEFIL in Congress P. 48 
 
Existing Challenges to Coordinating National Strategy  
Congressional Process and the Synchronization of National Power 
Challenges to Coordinating DIMEFIL Instruments   
Building DIMEFIL Capability and Capacity 
Challenges to Coordination 
 
Chapter 4. Case Study: Counterterrorism Strategies and Applications  P. 69 
 
Congress in the Post 9/11 Era  
 
Congress and the Growing Threat of Islamic State  
 
Conclusion P. 89 
 
Figure 1 P. 96 
 




This portfolio explores the topic of the instruments of national power and 
examines factors that challenge the development of national security strategy both in the 
executive and congressional branch of government. This portfolio identifies challenges in 
national government’s efforts to coordinate the instruments of national power to affect 
coherent strategy and efforts to build and employ capability and capacity. This portfolio 
theorizes that the growth in the instruments of national power have led to a degree of 
decentralized control among the newer additions to the list of instruments that challenges 
the ability to coordinate strategy in the executive and congressional branches of 
government.  The United States’ instruments of national power have grown in capability 
and capacity over time. This growth challenges coordination in both the executive and the 
congressional branch of government. In the executive branch this challenges the structure 
and coordination capability of the National Security Council as it seeks to coordinate 
national strategy. Additionally, this presents challenges to the congressional branch of 
government because the jurisdictional limits of the congressional committees affect 
holistic oversight and thus the ability to synchronize the funding and authorizations in the 
development of the instruments of national power.  
Definition of Key Terms  
This thesis portfolio ties together several concepts that relate to national power 
projection, the development of national capability, and the creation of national strategy in 
the US Government. In order to present the thesis, a few terms have to be put into context 
as they are reoccurring concepts through the four chapters. They are the concepts of 
instruments of national power, strategy, core capability, national objectives and 
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coordination. These concepts are foundational in the understanding of how both the 
executive and congressional branches build capability and formulate strategy, and are 
essential to understanding the nature of the challenges to the effective coordination of 
strategy.  
Instruments of National Power. Instruments of national power are the means to 
which strategy achieves its ends. They represent the different types of power the 
government can project abroad. Joint Doctrine Note 1-18 Strategy states that, “The means 
are the capabilities and resources one can bring to bear in the effort to attain the desired 
strategic ends.”1 The instruments of national power are commonly referred to by 
acronyms that list out a set of distinct capabilities. The acronym DIMEFIL is used to 
examine the instruments of national power, it stands for the diplomatic, information, 
military economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement powers that the US projects 
to achieve strategic ends. This portfolio illustrates that the concept of instruments of 
national power are not a fixed set of capabilities but rather they have expanded over time. 
As the US has further refined its approach to strategy, it has necessitated more distinct 
instruments to achieve national security objectives.  
Strategy. Strategy, as a concept for this portfolio, is the linking of national ends, 
ways, and means. In this framework, strategy involves the ability to effectively make an 
estimate of the situation, develop a desired end-state (ends), develop the capabilities that 
will be used to achieve the end-state (means) and designing the ways in which the 
capabilities will be employed to achieve the end-state (ways).2 Strategy exists at several 
                                                          
1 Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: Strategy, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 25 April 2018, P. II-5. Web: 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jdn1_18.pdf 
2 Ibid. P. vi.  
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levels within the executive branch. National strategy for instance, “orchestrates the 
instruments of national power in support of policy objectives and outlines a broad course 
of action or guidance statements adopted by the government at the national level in 
pursuit of national objectives.”3 National strategy is then used by the executive 
departments and agencies to develop subordinate strategies, to in turn, link their organic 
ends, ways, and means to achieve department and agency objectives, and in effect 
national security objectives. This nesting of department and agency strategy to national 
strategy is a top down planning approach to strategic employment of national capabilities.    
National Security Objectives. National security objectives are the end-states that 
national security strategy seeks to achieve. They are shaped by a much broader concept 
of national interest, which “refers to the well-being of American citizens and American 
enterprise involved in international relations and affected by political forces beyond the 
administrative control of the United States government.”4 The national interests are much 
too broad to plan strategy against. The National Security Strategy Primer published by 
the National Defense University states that: 
National interests should be the primary driver of ends when addressing a security 
challenge. They also provide the benchmark against which to assess threats to the 
nation, or opportunities for advancing the nation’s well-being. Yet national 
interests are generally too broad and amorphous to provide a concrete goal for a 
specific national security strategy. Strategies that set national interests as their 
goal run the risk of lacking a clear aim and thus diffusing effort.5 
 
                                                          
3 Ibid. P. vi.  
4 Nuechterlein, Donald E. “United States National Interests in a Changing World.” University Press of 
Kentucky, 2014. P. 6.ProQuest Ebook Central, 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jhu/detail.action?docID=1915860. 





In order to project power in any coherent way, specific objectives have to be established 
that are aligned with national interests, therefore national security objectives seek to set 
the favorable conditions through the application of instruments of national power to 
safeguard national interest.  
Core Capability. This thesis portfolio uses the term core capability to represent 
the means available to a department or agency to achieve national security objectives. 
This term is a generalization of a much more detailed concept such as the core 
competencies in the Department of Defense. The State Department does not categorize 
specific core capabilities, but it does state that diplomacy and development are the 
primary mechanisms that enable the State Department to achieve its objectives.6 These 
represent the two functional areas that the State Department and the United States 
Agency for International Development project abroad. Within the other instruments of 
the DIMEFIL spectrum there exists tangible capability that is projected abroad that is 
distinct to that instrument. Core capability for the purpose of this portfolio means the 
distinct elements of an instrument that are essential to achieving national security 
objectives.   
Coordination. The coordination of the instruments of national power towards 
national security objectives is the primary function of the National Security Council. The 
National Security Act of 1947 established the National Security Council and it states:  
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the 
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national 
security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and 
                                                          





agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving 
the national security.7 
 
The National Security Council coordinates national strategy by synchronizing the 
departments and agencies efforts towards national objectives. Joint Doctrine states that: 
“Each instrument of national power works most effectively when it supports and operates 
harmoniously with the other instruments of national power… Moreover, at any point in 
time, one of the instruments is usually playing the principal role in advancing the 
strategy, while the others are supporting”8 Coordination implies that the optimal 
resources are apportioned, and the department and agency objectives are directed towards 
coordinated ends. 
These terms aid in contextualizing the overall thesis and the key findings in each 
of the four chapters. The definition of each terms helps in the understanding of how a rise 
in the instruments of national power affects synchronization in the executive and 
congressional branches as they aim to achieve national security objectives. Additionally, 
the defined terms help to identify how the challenges to synchronization manifest in 
national government.  
Coordinating the Instruments of National Power 
Coordinated strategy implies that the instruments of national power, found in the 
departments and agencies, are synchronized both within and among the other instruments 
of power by either deconflicted, coordinated or reinforcing action. The conceptualization 
                                                          
7 National Security Act of 1947. Web: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/national-
security-act-of-1947 





of the instruments of national power make it easier to comprehend what the component 
functions should accomplish in strategy, but in execution the application of instruments 
of national power are not as linear. Synchronization is not directed laterally by the 
departments and agencies. This function is coordinated by the National Security Council 
and directed by the authority of the President of the United States. 
Within the executive branch the National Security Council is the lead entity for 
synchronizing national strategy among the departments and agencies. It coordinates 
policy through the Interagency Policy Committee, the Deputy Committee, the Principal 
Committee, and up to the National Security Council, ultimately for presidential action. 
Within the National Security Council there are statute members and non-statute members, 
which represent the range of instruments of national power all with varying degree of 
authority for policy coordination within the National Security Council. In execution of 
national strategy, the executive branch departments and agencies have the authoritative 
responsibilities to wield their respective instrument of national power to achieve national 
objectives. It is at the National Security Council level that coherent national strategy is 
developed and pushed back down to the departments and agencies through presidential 
policy. The polices direct the right mix among the instruments of national power and the 
required synchronization efforts that enable the United States to achieve national 
objectives.   
The congressional branch of government plays a very distinct roll in the 
synchronization of the instruments of national power. The congressional branch has the 
authoritative responsibility to build capability and capacity of the instruments of national 
power by authorizing and funding department and agency activity. Synchronization 
7 
 
occurs in the congressional branch by ensuring that the executive branch departments and 
agencies have the ability to project power. Congress uses the budgeting process and 
oversight authorities as the mechanisms for coordination. Within the congressional 
branch the core concepts that relate to instruments of national power and effective 
synchronization are committee jurisdiction, oversight and the authorization and 
appropriation process. The divide between the conceptualization of the instruments of 
national power and their representation among the executive departments and agencies is 
further exacerbated by asynchronous representation through committee jurisdiction. 
Committee jurisdiction governs the authorization and appropriation process as well as 
congressional oversight authority and this has a direct correlation to the development of 
capability and capacity of departments and agencies to wield the instruments of national 
power against national security objectives.  
Key Findings 
This portfolio makes three key findings that support the overall premise: that the 
growth in the instruments of national power have led to a degree of decentralized control 
among the newer additions to the list of instruments, and this growth presents challenges 
in the ability to coordinate strategy in the executive and congressional branches of 
government. The first key finding asserts that over time the US has expanded the lists of 
instruments of national power in both concept and in execution. The second key finding 
asserts that in addition to normative challenges to synchronization, the decentralization of 
DIMEFIL instruments among several executive departments and agencies challenges the 
coordination of national strategy in the National Security Council. The third key finding 
is similar to the second, in that amid the normative challenge to coordinating the 
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development of department and agency capability in the congressional branch, the growth 
of DIMEFIL instruments and the requirement to coordinate capability challenges the 
ability of congress to effectively budget and oversee the holistic DIMEFIL development. 
The fourth chapter illustrates the third key finding of congressional challenges through 
two case examples.  The first case exemplifies the challenges to coordinating the law 
enforcement and intelligence powers after September 11, 2001, as Congress sought to 
restructure in order to better coordinate the instruments of national power. The second 
case study demonstrates the budgeting and oversight challenges to effective coordination 
during the rise of ISIL, when a growing asymmetric threat signaled a demand to build 
and project coordinated DIMEFIL instruments in support of strategy.  
The first key finding is that the instruments of national power have grown in 
conception from pre-World War I to contemporary times. This is the basis for 
demonstrating the challenges in both the executive and congressional branch. The 
concept of the instruments of national power is the idea that national strategy uses distinct 
core capabilities in a synchronized manner to affect national strategy. Through 
congressional and executive action, departments and agencies wield the instruments of 
national power to achieve national security objectives. The instruments of national power 
are a conceptualization of power projection capability. They are conceptual in that the 
executive branch departments and agencies do not all necessarily represent a 1 to 1 
relation with each respective instrument. For instance, the military instrument is 
controlled by the Department of Defense, but the law enforcement instrument is not 
consolidated in one department. The Department of Justice and the Department of 
Homeland Security, both have law enforcement power projection capability, both are 
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separate departments with independent representation in the National Security Council 
and both are under different congressional committee jurisdictions. But, both the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security project power abroad. 
The second key finding is that the National Security Council’s ability to 
synchronize the instruments of national power is challenged by the decentralization of 
power among the instruments, because the executive agencies and departments have 
varying degrees of total authority over the corresponding instrument of national power. 
The National Security Council has a host of challenges that work against effective 
synchronization. Chapter two identifies four existential challenges to effective 
coordination through literature review which are: the bureaucratic nature of the National 
Security Council, the over reliance on the Department of Defense for power projection, 
parochialism among the departments and agencies and a tendency to focus on crisis 
management over effective national strategy. These four challenges are the common 
themes when examining the challenges to effective coordination. This chapter expands on 
these four themes by positing that the expansion of the instruments of power have 
decentralized the newer additions of the DIMEFIL instruments which presents a distinct 
challenge to coordination. For instance, the Department of Defense is solely responsible 
for military power, but intelligence powers are spread across 16 different members of the 
Intelligence Community. In the NSC the Director on National Intelligence is the senior 
intelligence representative but many of the authorities for intelligence projection are 
decentralized throughout the department and agencies within the executive branch. 
The third key finding pertains to decentralization in the congressional branch. As 
the instruments of national power have increased, they have created additional challenges 
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to affect coordinated power projection capability in the congressional branch. This 
chapter identifies the power dynamic between the executive and the congressional 
branch, jurisdictional challenges and effective oversight as the baseline challenges to 
effective synchronization of national strategy in Congress. This portfolio adds to the 
discourse by asserting that as the instruments of national power have expanded to 
encompass the DIMEFIL range of core power projection capabilities, the ability of 
Congress to apply effective oversight and execute the budgeting process is further 
challenged. This third key finding is illustrated in the fourth chapter through a case study. 
This case study looks at two events that signaled the need to address the challenges 
associated with effective projection of coordinated capability in Congress, the 9/11 
Commission Report and the rise if ISIL in the 114th legislative session. Both cases 
presented an emergent asymmetric threat that required coordinated power projection 
across the DIMEFIL spectrum. The case study demonstrates that Congress was able to 
make gains in coordination capability and address jurisdictional challenges, but it did not 
implement much of the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission Report. Furthermore, 
during the 114th legislative session ISIL came onto the world stage and Congress was 
then faced with assessing and building capability and capacity among the departments 
and agencies with full knowledge of the coordination requirements to affect national 
strategy. But the activity during the 114th legislative session was minimal, and it 
abdicated much of its oversight authority and ability to affect a coordinated strategy by 
not passing required authorization bills and passing an omnibus spending bill that 
reflected previous years spending plans that were developed before the rise of ISIL.  
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These key findings illustrate a conceptual approach to examining congressional 
and executive activity as it relates to projecting core capability. The decentralization of 
the instruments of national power in the executive and congressional branches add 
challenges to developing national strategy. This study does not evaluate the operational 
necessity of the diffusion of capability throughout the executive departments and 
agencies and throughout the congressional committee structure as there is utility in a 
decentralized approach. The decentralization of core capability does present a list of 
specific challenges to the both the executive and congressional branch as they seek to 





























Chapter 1:  Growth of Instruments of National Power 
 
The instruments of national power are the tools the United States government uses 
to achieve national objectives. They encompass a spectrum of specific powers identified 
by the acronym DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Finance, 
Intelligence, and Law Enforcement.) These instruments are powers that largely manifest 
in the executive branch departments and agencies. The concept of instruments of national 
power describes the individual tools that nations uses to project soft and hard power 
abroad. This concept has evolved by expanding the notion of individual instruments to 
include a greater range of powers. This chapter asserts that the United States, over time, 
has increased its conception of instruments of national power to more effectively apply 
specific national powers in the formulation of national strategy. Additionally, this chapter 
identifies which executive branch departments and agencies represent the individual 
components of DIMEFIL instruments. Although the concept of DIMEFIL instruments 
precisely categorizes distinct capabilities, the instruments of national power are not 
always represented by a single department or agency. How DIMEFIL instruments 
manifest in government has grown to be a complex array of powers that manifest among 
several departments and agencies. 
One of the earlier examinations of the instruments of national power was written 
by political scientist E.H. Carr in his book “The Twenty Years Crisis,” where he 
examined Soviet and United States international relations before World War II.9 He 
                                                          
9 Carr, Edward H. The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939, An Introduction to The Study of International 
Relations. London, England. MacMillan & Co. Ltd. 1946. P. 108. 
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makes reference to specific instruments of power and notes that the projection of 
instruments of power require a degree of coordination:  
Political power in the international sphere may be divided, for purposes of 
discussion, into three categories: (a) military power, (b) economic power, (c) 
power over opinion. We shall find, however, that these categories are closely 
interdependent; and though they are theoretically separable, it is difficult in 
practice to imagine a country for any length of time possessing one kind of power 
in isolation from the others. In its essence, power is an indivisible whole.10   
 
Carr’s early reference to the distinct instruments calls out political power as the sum of 
military, economic, and power of opinion. The reference of power of opinion is an early 
conceptualization of the more contemporary understating of the instrument of 
information and diplomacy. This early examination establishes that power projection, as 
an activity, is a coordinated effort among component capabilities. Additionally, a central 
theme to Carr’s observation is that coordination among the instruments is implied and an 
essential part of power projection. 
With the end of the World War II, the world rested in a completely different 
balance of power. The Cold War shifted the understanding of instruments of national 
power and codified four distinct instruments as the mechanisms for projecting national 
power. Further expansion on the concept of instruments of national power brought into 
the lexicon the acronym DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic.)11 The 
complexities of international affairs made executive branch coordination an essential part 
of effective power projection. The need to coordinate the instruments of national power 
                                                          
10 Carr, Edward H. The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939, An Introduction to The Study of International 
Relations. London, England. MacMillan & Co. Ltd. 1946. P. 108 
11 Worley, Robert. Orchestrating the Instruments of Power. Potomac Books. 2015. P., 225 
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drove the reorganization of the executive branch with the signing of the National Security 
Act of 1947. Richard Best notes:  
Given continuing worldwide responsibilities in the postwar years that involved 
active diplomacy, sizable military forces, sophisticated intelligence agencies, in 
addition to economic assistance in various forms, the United States established 
organizational mechanisms to analyze the international environment, identify 
priorities, and recommend appropriate policy options.12 
 
The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council (NSC) as the 
principal body for coordinating the instruments of national power against national 
security objectives. The NSC and instruments of national power were aligned 
conceptually to orient strategy and powers on the Russian threat.13 DIME represented the 
core capabilities that states used to project power on other states in order to influence 
relations and achieve objectives.  
The nature of US international relations changed again in the post September 11th 
2001 timeframe. The elevation of the threat of terrorism as a focal point in United States 
national strategy demonstrated gaps in the concept of DIME as the total components of 
power projection capability. The traditional instruments of diplomatic, information, 
military and economic powers were less effective at influencing non-state actors. The 
asymmetric nature of non-state actors presented a unique set of challenges that 
necessitated the projection of distinct instruments of national power. The DIME construct 
is focused more towards state on state interaction and does not translate to the operating 
environment unique to asymmetric warfare. For instance, military activity when projected 
                                                          
12 Best, Richard. “The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment.” Congressional Research 
Service. December 2011. P. 1. Web: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30840.pdf 
13 Jordan, Taylor, Mazarr; American National Security. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.P. 544 
15 
 
against non-state actors, still takes place within in foreign state borders. Additionally, the 
US may not have direct diplomatic ties with non-state actors. Economic trade agreements 
and sanctions have little to no direct effect on non-state actors. DIME powers began to 
show limitations against asymmetric threats.  
Power projection had to expand beyond the state on state instruments of power in 
order to achieve objectives against non-state actors. The US had to incorporate a broader 
range of capabilities in order for strategy to be effective. This shift elevated financial, 
intelligence, and law enforcement powers to become conceptually distinct instruments 
that were capable of projecting influence to achieve national objectives.14 In its current 
form, the acronym DIMEFIL represents the conceptual expansion of powers or 
instruments that a nation can project on foreign entities, both state and non-state, to 
achieve a desired outcome.15  
The expansion of instruments of national power beyond DIME to include finance, 
intelligence and law enforcement is evident in academia as a conceptual framework and 
exists in national strategy as a model for analyzing power projection capabilities. Because 
the notion of instruments of power is a conceptual framework, there is contention on 
what constitutes the range of power projection capabilities and utility of DIMEFIL in 
various operating environments. But what is thematic throughout the discourse in 
academia is that the dynamic nature of international affairs has necessitated growth in 
power projection beyond the traditional DIME construct. In practice, US national strategy 
has adopted the DIMEFIL model and uses it to articulate core power projection 
                                                          
14 National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, 2006, P.1 
15 Worley, Robert. Orchestrating the Instruments of Power. Potomac Books. 2015. P. 225 
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capabilities in National Strategy, Counterterrorism Strategy and Department of Defense 
planning publications.    
A host of scholarship contends that the nature of asymmetric threats has 
necessitated the expansion of DIME to DIMEFIL. Arwood, Mills and Raines detail in an 
Air force Institute of Technology study that, “As the global environment has become 
more complex, the DIME construct has evolved accordingly… These additional 
instruments of national power are a direct result of the increasingly joint, combined, and 
interagency nature of operations.”16 Similarly Shellman, Levey and Leonard note in a 
Violent Intranational Political Conflict and Terrorism (VIPCAT) Research Laboratory 
study that, “Following the onset of the U.S.‘s War on Terrorism and a shift in focus from 
interstate warfare to intrastate, asymmetric warfare against insurgent groups, the military 
reconsidered its strategy set when facing such unconventional enemies. The result was 
DIMEFIL, an expansion of the original DIME concept, specifically designed for 
counterinsurgency operations.”17 In more current context, the inclusion of finance, 
intelligence and law enforcement as distinct instruments of national power has surfaced 
in evaluative discourse concerning the Islamic State.18 David Johnson in a Parameters 
                                                          
16 Arwood, Sam; Robert Mills; and Richard Raines. “Operational Art and Strategy in Cyberspace.” 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Warfare & Security, January 2010, 16–22. 
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=49549137&site=e
host-live&scope=site 
17 Shellman, Stephen M.; Levey, Brian; Leonard Hans H. “Countering the Adversary: Effective Policies or 
a DIME a Dozen?” Violent Intranational Political Conflict and Terrorism (VIPCAT) Research Laboratory. 
College of William and Marry. 2011. P. 6. Web: 
http://strategicanalysisenterprises.com/papers/countering.adversary.hscb.apsa.pdf 
18 Nagata, Michael, Abbas, Ali; et al. Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL. Strategic Multilayer Assessment 




article states that an evaluation of all DIMEFIL powers in counter-ISIL policy is critical 
to securing US policy objectives.19  
Academic discourse on the subject of instruments of national power generally 
accepts the notion that the operational environment has identified limits to the traditional 
application of DIME. Dr Oscarson, in an Open NATO Publication, observes that the 
application of DIME instruments is not effective in both asymmetric warfare and hybrid 
warfare because the power projected by DIME fails to influence actors that seek to defy 
traditional methods of state power projection, necessitating the expansion to DIMEFIL.20 
Among asymmetric warfare planners and experts, the notion of DIMEFIL represents the 
additional means to achieve national objectives, but it is not definitive. The US Army 
War College notes in its course work:  
Besides the traditional DIME elements, the counterterrorist community has added 
intelligence, legal or law enforcement, and financial to their list of elements of 
power—giving the acronym MIDLIFE or DIMEFIL. Those are useful tools to 
consider in the war on terrorism, although the expanded categories of national 
power have not gained broad acceptance beyond the counterterrorism 
community.21 
 
The US Army War College course on National Security goes on to note that there is no 
definitively established framework articulating what the list of instruments of national 
power are, but the “U.S. has embraced this kind of more complex image of national 
                                                          
19 Johnson, David. “Fighting the “Islamic State” The Case for US Ground Forces.” Parameters, US army 
War College. 2015. P. 16. Web:  
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Issues/Spring_2015/4_Special-Commentary_Johnson.pdf 
20 Oscarson, Katerina. The Effectiveness of DIMEFIL Instruments of Power in the Gray Zone. NATO 
Open Publication. Volume 1, Number 2. 2017. P. 15-16. Web: 
https://www.academia.edu/32325460/The_Effectiveness_of_DIMEFIL_Instruments_of_Power_in_the_Gra
y_Zone 
21 Bartholomees, Boone.  Theory of War And Strategy. US Army War College, Guide to National Security 




power, and a series of formal policy documents have introduced contrasting models of 
power intended to convey the conclusion that viewed comprehensively national power 
has multiple and overlapping sources.”22 DMEFIL therefore represents an articulation of 
expanded core capabilities geared towards projecting power more effectively in pursuit of 
national objectives.23 Although there is academic discourse in the efficacy of DIMEFIL 
over DIME there is consistent views that the nature of the operating environment 
challenges the DIME model.  
Despite academic discourse, US policy in practice uses DIMEFIL as a framework 
for articulating the range of US capabilities to affect strategy. This is evident in the 
language of the 2017 National Security Strategy as it calls out a range of power 
projection capabilities to include powers across the DIMEFIL spectrum.24 The 2018 
National Counterterrorism Strategy specifically refers to finance, intelligence and law 
enforcement, as distinct tools essential to achieving counter terrorism strategy:  
Counterterrorism efforts must be properly balanced across all instruments of 
national power and include the efforts of traditional and non-traditional partners. 
While the United States must retain the ability to strike at terrorism around the 
globe, non-military tools—such as law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, 
financial measures, stabilization, development, prevention, and intervention and 
reintegration programs—are also required to prevent and counter terrorism.”25 
 
                                                          
22 Ibid., p. 143.  
23 Ibid., P. 144.  
24 National Security Strategy. 2017. Web: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-
Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 
25 United States Government. National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America. 




The 2011 National Terrorism Strategy makes similar distinction, calling out finance, 
intelligence and law enforcement powers in addition to the mainstays of diplomatic and 
military tools.  
The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all 
elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military 
power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities 
to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and 
deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive. We have broken 
old orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism efforts primarily to the 
criminal justice domain.26 
 
Additionally, the DIMEFIL framework is used in the most current National Strategy for 
Homeland Security, as it states, “The United States will use all instruments of national  
power and influence – diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, 
intelligence, and law enforcement – to achieve our goals to prevent and disrupt terrorist 
attacks; protect the American people, critical infrastructure, and key resources; and 
respond to and recover from incidents that do occur.”27 The inclusion of finance 
intelligence and law enforcement in national strategy articulates the requirement to 
project a broad range of powers to achieve a range of national security objectives. 
DIMEFIL is used in the development of strategy and DIMEFIL powers are projected in 
the execution of national strategy. In academic circles there is contention on the efficacy 
of DIMEFIL as a framework for describing the means in which the US project national 
                                                          
26 United States Government. National Strategy for Counterterrorism of the United States of America. 
Office of the President. 2011. P. 1. Web: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=466588 





power. Ultimately, the instruments of national power are the tools that policy makers use 
to achieve national objectives and DIMEFIL is an articulated framework.  
 The addition of finance, intelligence and law enforcement powers presents policy 
makers with distinct core capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. The expansion of 
DIME to DIMEFIL calls out specific capabilities that rely on disparate departments and 
agencies across the federal government to project power. Incorporating the range 
DIMEFIL instruments into a strategy. The newer additions provide distinct capabilities 
that are critical to achieving national security objectives.   
Growing Financial Power 
The nature of financial power as a distinct instrument of national power 
incorporates two key concepts. First is the ability to use capital as an instrument of power 
projection. This differs from economic power as economic power is associated with 
projecting access to US markets and economic forces through trade agreements and 
sanctions. Financial power is focused on the strength of the US dollar and the ability to 
use access to capital as an instrument of national power. The second concept is using 
financial mechanisms to project influence. This aspect of financial power relates to 
limiting foreign actors’ access to capital, as well as using financial systems and 
architecture to achieve US security objectives. The principal federal department charged 
with coordinating financial power towards policy objectives is the US Treasury. The US 
Treasury states: “Treasury's Office of International Affairs protects and supports US 
economic prosperity by strengthening the external environment for US growth, 
preventing and mitigating global financial instability, and managing key global 
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challenges.”28 These two concepts detail how distinct actions projected by financial 
instruments harnessed by the US Department of Treasury are critical to overall US power 
projection capability.  
 Using the US dollar as an instrument of national power is foundational to 
achieving national security objectives. The US dollar is both an asset to be secured and a 
means to project power. Paul Viotti in his book, “The Dollar and National Security” notes 
that the “Defense establishments and the armed forces they organize, train, equip and 
deploy depend upon the security of capital and capital flows.”29 The policies that 
influence its values have a direct correlation to the ability to project power and thus 
directly influence the other instruments of national power. The value of the US dollar is 
also a leverage tool. Robert Blackwell and Jennifer Harris in their book “War by other 
means” notes that the US Government used “the prevalence of the US dollar in global 
finance to shut out what it considered rogue banks. And, using America’s central role in 
financial markets, US officials also began effectively conscripting banks all over the 
world into enforcement agents, presenting them with a simple choice: either comply with 
US sanctions or stop doing business in the US Dollar.”30 The strength of the dollar and 
the ability of the US to manipulate access to the dollar is the foundation of financial 
power. 
Financial power has grown to include the ability to influence activity in the 
international banking and financial sectors. In Juan Zarate’s book, Treasury’s War, he 
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details how the Treasury Department was instrumental in the War on Terrorism as it used 
distinct financial powers against Al Qaeda.  
[The Treasury] put at a premium on finding financial trails so that we could 
understand Al Qaeda’s network, disrupt its operations, and constrict its global 
reach and most strategic and threatening ambitions. Following Al Qaeda’s 
financial footprints became a new discipline and formed the backbone of our 
efforts to crush the organization and its operations. And to follow these tracks, the 
United States needed to build a new enterprise that would leverage access of 
massive amounts of financial data.31  
 
Zarate goes on to note how the Treasury projected national financial power on foreign 
actors by arresting assets.32 The ability to seize assets independent of other DIME 
instruments demonstrates a distinct financial power as well as the coordination required 
through associated law enforcement channels. Correspondingly, the US Department of 
Treasury brought financial intelligence to the forefront of financial power projection. 
Complimenting Zarate’s account, Rollins and Wyler in a Congressional Research Service 
report remark how financial power has become a key tool in national counter-terrorism 
policy.  
Many observers have argued that a key tool to combat the confluence of crime 
and terrorism is to follow their overlapping money trails and apply financial 
sanctions and heightened regulatory conditions to vulnerable financial sectors. 
Both types of groups require funds to sustain operations, and such funds often 
intersect with the formal international banking system.33  
 
The ability of the United States to use financial power became more distinct after 
September 11, 2001. The US leveraged the strength of the dollar in its policies to combat 
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terrorism. The US used access to the dollar to track financial information in order to 
detect nefarious activity. The dollar as an instrument of hard power, coopted foreign 
financial institutions to adopt policies consistent with US objectives. These capabilities 
are distinct from the other instruments because they relate to projecting access to or the 
restriction of access to hard currency, but like the other instruments of power, the 
financial instrument is not independent of the other instruments of national power.  
Growing Intelligence Power 
The complex dynamic of US threats, allies and the operating environment has 
developed to the point that projecting intelligence has itself become a distinct instrument 
of national power. Intelligence power projection differs from information power 
projection because as instruments they describe very distinct capability sets and in 
execution the authorities and mechanisms for strategic messaging and projecting 
information are not retained in the intelligence community. Intelligence as a power, 
projects capability abroad to collect information that other state and non-state actors 
actively seek to secure. The information instrument power, with roots in the power of 
persuasion seeks to project a narrative to influence state and non-state actors through 
strategic messaging. Intelligence is focused on adversarial capabilities. 
Without a functional understanding of the threat and the operating environment, 
national security policy would be useless. Recent history has demonstrated that 
intelligence failures can result in misguided policy, and conversely, reliable intelligence 
has enabled sound policy to achieve its objective. But beyond its internal value as a 
critical component to the development of national security policy, it is now conceived of 
as a distinct instrument of power projection.  
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The US projects access to its intelligence as a core capability. The complexities of 
the global environment place stress on the finite capabilities of the US intelligence 
community. This has placed greater emphasis on value of intelligence sharing in order to 
garner information and access held by foreign intelligence agencies. A study on foreign 
intelligence sharing noted:   
The growth of these transnational threats has impelled intelligence services to 
cooperate with counterparts in other states in order to meet these challenges. 
Cooperation between selected Western states and in certain areas of intelligence 
operations (such as signals intelligence) is longstanding. Since 9/11, however, 
there has been an exponential increase in both the scope and scale of intelligence 
cooperation, including that between formerly non-aligned and hostile states.34 
 
The idea that sharing access to intelligence in order to affect policy enables the US to 
project its intelligence capability to get access to information and intelligence means that 
it needs, but otherwise cannot get. Additionally, states can restrict access to their 
intelligence as a way to project power. For instance, Britain in 2017, had temporarily 
restricted its intelligence sharing with the US in response to intelligence sharing that 
occurred between the United States and Russia.35 Although information and intelligence 
sharing has been evidenced throughout history, it is now considered a distinct instrument 
of national power rather than an enabling function.  
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Another aspect of intelligence projection relates to the ability to collect 
information on adversarial actions, capability and intent. Lowenthal states in his book 
“Intelligence, From Policy to Secrets,” that:  
Information is needed about [threat] actors, their intentions, their likely actions, 
and their capabilities in a variety of areas, including economic, military and 
societal. The United States built its intelligence organizations in recognition of the 
fact that some of the information it would like to have is either inaccessible or 
being actively denied. In other words, the information is secret as far as the 
United States is concerned, and those who have the information would like to 
keep it that way.36  
 
In this very traditional sense, intelligence capability is projected abroad in order to 
determine what the foreign actors are doing. The US uses intelligence both as a tool to be 
projected abroad and as an enabling tool to bolster other instruments by creating a clearer 
picture of the operating environment than is readily available through normal 
informational channels.  
Growing Law Enforcement Power 
The law enforcement instrument is the final addition to the expanded list of 
instruments. Similar to the other instruments, law enforcement power provides a distinct 
set of core capabilities that differs from the rest of the DIME instruments. Both the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security as well as others 
departments and agencies are capable of projecting law enforcement power abroad. For 
instance, both Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security have 
established counter terrorism as a prioritized strategic goal, this is achieved in large part 
by conducting activities abroad. This is a shift from domestic rule of law activities, 
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because of the requirement to project law enforcement abroad in order to meet the 
national objectives. For instance the FBI under the Department of Justice has “63 legal 
attaché offices—commonly known as legats—and more than two dozen smaller sub-
offices in key cities around the globe, providing coverage for more than 180 countries, 
territories, and islands.”37 The legal attaché program is separate from diplomatic activities 
because the program gains its authorities from the Department of Justice and is managed 
by the International Operations Division at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.38 
Similarly the DEA under the Department of Justice projects power outside the borders of 
the united states to achieve national security objectives. A 2007 audit of DEA foreign 
activities states that: 
In order to combat the highest priority drug trafficking organizations, the DEA 
must extend its operations to other countries where major drug traffickers live and 
preside over illegal operations. As a result, the DEA has 751 employees in 59 
other countries who work with foreign law enforcement agencies, as well as with 
other U.S. agencies operating in the international arena, to accomplish its 
mission.39  
 
The Department of Justice details in its strategic audit report that the law enforcement 
instrument is a critical component to achieving national counter terrorism objectives. 
Captured in the Department of Justice FY 17 Annual Plan is not only the view that the 
law enforcement provides capability, but evidences the conception that the other 
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instruments of national power cannot achieve what the Department of Justice can 
provide.40  
Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is postured to project 
power abroad, by adopting a similar focus across a wide range of law enforcement sub-
disciplines. The Homeland Security Investigations International Operations Division is 
“the Department of Homeland Security’s largest investigative presence overseas. 
Division personnel serve as liaisons to governments and law enforcement agencies across 
the globe and work side-by-side with foreign law enforcement on HSI investigations 
overseas.”41 Shiffman and Hoffman describe the scope of power projection capability of 
the DHS by noting that: 
DHS touches more of the public on a daily basis than any other federal agency. 
Because of this, DHS has demands placed on it that other interagency actors do 
not and DHS has benefited from the gained unique insight. The DHS workforce 
of officers, agents, screeners and sailors engages closely with local officials and 
law enforcement on a continuous basis. Additionally, thousands of DHS 
employees work outside the United States, attempting to identify the threats long 
before they reach our shores. DHS employs more workers outside the U.S. 
Borders than the State Department – only the DoD has more federal employees 
oversees.42  
 
The DHS and DoJ are positioned throughout the globe in order to project a considerable 
amount of national law enforcement power in support of national security objectives. The 
DHS and DoJ have both articulated terrorism as a top priority which focuses law 
enforcement activities abroad in concert with host nation law enforcement operations. 
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Both departments have expanded beyond domestic law enforcement roles and project 
power abroad under the authority of the respective federal agency and in coordination 
with State Department initiatives.    
 
Conclusion 
The evolution of power projection has demonstrated that the instruments of 
national power have grown over the last century. The conceptualization of the 
instruments of national power in the period prior to World War II were rooted in military, 
economic and the power of persuasion. The concept of instruments of national power 
expanded after WWII to include information and diplomacy and introduced the acronym 
DIME. In response to the War on Terrorism, the instruments again expanded to include 
finance, intelligence and law enforcement. The newer additions to the DIMEFIL 
spectrum are now dispersed through many departments and agencies, who all are 
independently responsible for projecting the respective instrument of national power. The 
growth signaled distinct aspects of core capabilities that the United States projects to 








Chapter 2.  NSC Challenges to Coordinating the Instruments of National Power 
Within the National Security Council 
The National Security Council is the primary government body that is responsible 
for coordinating national security strategy. Its main function is to coordinate department 
and agency policies toward achieving overall national level objectives. By design, the 
National Security Council is charged with overcoming the inherent challenges of 
coordinating the range of departments and agency policies. The NSC does not write 
individual department and agency policy, but coordinates the policies towards a 
comprehensive goal. Though bureaucratic process it makes recommendations to the 
President on policy options in which the President can then direct department and agency 
policy through presidential authorities. Therefore, the NSC, inherent to its organizational 
structure and authorities, experiences challenges that are directly attributed to 
coordinating the instruments of national power. This chapter identifies the themes 
throughout scholarship on the challenges to coordination in the NSC and then adds to the 
discourse by asserting that the expansion of instruments of national power adds to the 
challenges of effective coordination in the executive branch.   
This chapter establishes the second key finding of the thesis portfolio, which is 
that the conceptual expansion of more distinct instruments requires the incorporation of 
instrumental power that is decentralized across several departments and agencies and this 
decentralization challenges effective coordination in the NSC. This key finding is 
demonstrated through an examination of how the instruments of national power are 
represented in the National Security Council. As the instruments of national power have 
grown, their representation in the National Security Council have become more 
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decentralized because instrumental powers reside across multiple departments and 
agencies. This adds a layer of complexity because the NSC then has to coordinate 
instrumental power among several departments and agencies vice just one. This chapter 
expands off the key finding in chapter one as it looks specifically within the NSC and 
how expansion of powers affects coordination.   
Organizational challenges are not a new focus area in the assessment of the 
effectiveness of the NSC in developing policy. Scholarship has identified existing 
organizational challenges that affect the synchronization of instruments of national 
power. This chapter identifies four common themes when assessing the challenges that 
directly affect the ability of the NSC to coordinate the instruments of national power. 
This chapter adds that more distinct instruments of national power that are decentralized 
among several departments and agencies is an additional challenge to effective 
coordination. Evaluating the structure NSC through the context of DIMEFIL instruments 
demonstrates additional challenges and adds the discourse on overall challenges to 
effective formulation of coordinated strategy in the NSC.  
Known Organizational Challenges 
The National Security Council is subject to identified coordination challenges 
when making national strategy. These challenges relate to the structure, authorities and 
capability of the executive departments and agencies that wield the instruments of 
national power. Additionally, the structure of the NSC itself presents challenges. George 
and Rishikof outline in their book “The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the 
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Labyrinth," four challenges that manifest when coordinating national strategy.43 These 
four challenges are: the bureaucratic nature of the NSC, the over reliance on the 
Department of Defense and the military instrument of national power, parochialism 
within the executive agencies when coordinating national security policy, and the NSC’s 
fixation on crisis management vice policy synchronization. These challenges are 
consistent themes among other analysis that relate to the coordination of the instruments 
of national power within the NSC. The four challenges are more general in nature and 
have been factors since the inception of the Nation Security Council, but present a 
consistent theme. They represent a baseline of coordination challenges that affect 
coordination in the executive branch. The expansion of the instruments of national power 
as a separately distinct phenomenon stresses these existing challenges. Adding additional 
capability and capacity as well as additional agency coordination causes stress on the 
organizational structure of the NSC.   
Bureaucratic Nature of the NSC. This theme relates most directly to the 
expansion of the instruments of national power. The NSC, as an organization, has grown 
in size over time. Richard Best describes, in his historical analysis of the NSC, how the 
NSC has evolved from a small council of four individuals to its current state as a large 
bureaucratic organization.44 With this growth came a range of authorities for coordinating 
national security policy. Best describes how in each administration, the National Security 
Council had distinct challenges ranging from the limited authority to ensure coordination 
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of the instruments of power, to the other extreme, where the NSC directed policy and 
used specific instruments of power independent of presidential authorities.45 Best’s 
analysis details how in each administration the NSC adapted to meet specific challenges 
that faced the executive branch, and specifically the organization structure and authorities 
dictated by the President that either aided to, or was a friction point to, the success of the 
National Security Council.46 But ultimately, the organization of the NSC has grown over 
time and its functions are directed by the President to enable decision-making. George 
and Rishikof capture the organizational complexities that the National Security Council 
faces when coordinating the instruments of national power, and how the NSC had 
evolved from its inception: 
What was once a function largely focused on the President, his Secretaries of 
State and Defense, and his military and intelligence advisors is now spread across 
virtually every department. So, when senior meetings are held on international 
topics, the range of agencies will span the foreign and security field but also law 
enforcement agencies and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the 
Economic departments of Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture; or the technical 
fields of the Centers for Disease Control, and Prevention, NASA, or the Office of 
the Science Advisor.47  
 
The expansion of staff and advisors have exposed the National Security Council to 
organizational dynamics that become inhibitors to effective planning and 
synchronization. The more instruments there are to coordinate, the harder it is to 
coordinate them. Kathleen McInnis, in a Congressional Research Service report, 
describes how the issue of bureaucratic growth becomes polarized between two “camps.” 
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The first being that the NSC has grown commensurate with the requirement to 
synchronize the instruments of national power, thus the large organizational structure is 
necessary.48 The other view is that it has grown too much and its influence reaches too far 
into the synchronization of instruments of national powers at the departmental level.49  
These observations all illustrate friction points within the structure of the NSC. 
The first is Best’s observation that the structure of the NSC is dictated by the 
organizational preferences of the President. The second is George and Rishikof’s 
observation that the NSC has to coordinate the instruments of national power across a 
large body of cabinet staff, and executive agencies and experts. McInnis observes that the 
large NSC staff focuses on departmental level coordination rather than strategic 
coordination and alignment of instruments of national power. All show that 
organizationally the NSC is large and subject to bureaucratic challenges that affect the 
ability to coordinate national policy.  
The Over Reliance on the Department of Defense. Many of the instruments of 
national power are heavily influenced or overshadowed by military power.50 Strategic 
planners tend to use military power as a one source solution rather than strategically align 
all instruments against national security objectives, because it is ready and capable of 
world-wide projection.51 The limitations this has on power projection is identified by the 
Defense Department and is codified in its doctrinal publications: “Military power cannot, 
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by itself, restore or guarantee stable peace. It must, however, establish global, regional, 
and local conditions that allow the other instruments of national power—diplomatic, 
informational, and economic—to exert their full influence.”52 Conversely, Gordon 
Adams observes that the U.S. Military “is the world’s only truly global military force: it 
could, if needed, deploy to any country, fly in any airspace, sail to any port. It has the 
only global logistics, infrastructure, transportation, communications and intelligence. 
Neither the civilian institutions, nor any other country, have equivalent capacity, 
resources, flexibility or readiness.”53 Adams notes how the capability of the military 
provides ready response options for policy makers. George and Rishikof on the other 
hand detail how other U.S. Departments and agencies responsible for implementing the 
other instruments do not have ready forces for global contingency operations to the scale 
of the military.54  
This theme was also the primary finding of the Atlantic Council Combatant 
Command Task Force, a study of interagency power projection chaired by Gen. James 
Jones USMC (Ret.) and former National Security Advisor. The study notes: “The US 
government currently has only one structure, the geographic combatant command, to 
execute foreign and defense policy in key regions of the world. At present, there is no 
mechanisms in place to integrate activities of all US Government department and 
agencies in key regions.”55 The theme of Department of Defense primacy in power 
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projection is seen as an inhibitor to effective synchronization of the instruments across 
the DIMEFIL spectrum of national power because it does not bring to bear the targeted 
capabilities of the larger government enterprise. 
Parochialism Within Each of the Executive Agencies. Parochialism is the opposite 
of unity of effort. It is defined by the competition among the different departments and 
agencies as they compete for resources, missions and authorities. This is a challenge 
because the effect of parochialism drives each department and agency to bolster their 
own capability and capacity to achieve national objectives rather than taking a secondary 
or supportive subordinate role to another agency towards a particular national objective. 
Kim Holmes notes in a Heritage Foundation article that, “[t]he basic problem is that 
contradictions are built into the very nature of the NSC. On the one hand, it is supposed 
to be at the service of the President—that is, the President’s principal source of advice. 
On the other hand, the President’s advisors are also cabinet officials who are in charge of 
huge operations with their own distinct cultures and interests.”56 This theme is articulated 
in many examinations of the NSC and has been a key driver in what is referred to as an 
“Honest Broker” model developed by Brent Scowcroft and Collin Powell.57 In Hoffman 
and Neuhard’s article “Avoiding Strategic Inertia” they examine the theory involving the 
“honest broker” model to temper agency and department parochialism:  
The honest broker serves as a neutral referee between competing cabinet or 
department views, seeking to refine options, draw out debates, and enhance policy 
options. Cabinet officers prefer an advisor who avoids taking sides and merely 
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sets the table for a debate. Others are wary of the advisor’s proximity to the Oval 
Office and independent views. Historically, the job has centered on getting 
multiple perspectives in front of the council, vetting them, and not letting strong-
minded department heads steamroll a premature option isolated from the White 
House.58 
 
The NSC by design creates opportunity for executive agencies to work against each other 
in order to gain primacy by securing equity in national security policy. It is the role of the 
NSC Advisor to temper that contest for control by the departments and agencies and 
advise the President on the right mix of national power projection to achieve national 
security objectives. The honest broker model, as an example of mitigating strategies, 
attempts to remedy parochialism by calling objectivity to the forefront in decision 
making. But it also evidences the existential nature of parochial forces within the NSC, 
and their effect on coordination of instruments of national power.    
Focus on Crisis Management Vice Strategic Planning. Crisis certainly affects 
prioritization of effort. The NSC is no less susceptible to this challenge to coordination. 
Jordan, Taylor and Mazarr explain how crisis impacts coordination and the policy 
process in the book “American National Security” by observing that national security 
decision making process is vastly complex and as the severity of the issues rise, the fewer 
decision makers are involved in the process. “There are regularized processes for 
decision making, but the issues themselves and the particular ways they arise often 
dictate the precise method by which they are addressed.”59 Jordan, Taylor and Mazarr 
describe policy rings, which are concentric circles of influence surrounding the President, 
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at the inner circle sits the President, the next circle is the President’s advisors, followed 
by the office and staff of the President, then the executive departments and agencies and 
finally Congress.60 Emerging issues, emergencies, analysis and the policy response 
options can originate within every ring, but ultimately have to make it to the President for 
decision. Issues that necessitate a national security response are then grouped into routine 
and priority level categories, “Factors such as secrecy, immediacy, political sensitivity, 
and seriousness of impact tend to place decisions into either the ‘routine’ or ‘priority’ 
category. Routine decisions generally involve more of the circles of policy making, 
whereas priority decisions, especially those that require great secrecy and quick action 
are often made at the inner one or two circles.”61 Jordan, Taylor and Mazarr make a 
critical observation because as the severity increases and the political sensitivity 
increases, the policy options and the required coordination are not processed through the 
structure. There is less analytic rigor focused on coordination among the DIMEFIL 
spectrum, in an effort to create a response. This is a speed vs accuracy dilemma, and it is 
existential in the NSC. When the NSC is coordinating the instruments of national power, 
as the importance and time sensitive nature of requirements grows more effort is focused 
on crisis management and response and less effort is focused on effective coordination.  
These four challenges have an impact on how the instruments of national power 
are coordinated and describe the nature of the forces that provide friction in coordinating 
policy to meet national security objectives. The bureaucracy within the NSC and how it 
affects the decision making process, the over reliance on the Department of Defense to 
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project power across the DIMEFIL spectrum, the parochialism within the departments 
and agencies as they seek equity in national security, and speed vs accuracy dilemma that 
is associated with crisis at the NSC rather than the formulation of comprehensive and 
coordinated national strategy all affect the way the instruments are used to protect the 
nation’s interests. All of these factors challenge the way that policy is coordinated to 
form the right mix of DIMEFIL instruments against national objectives. These factors are 
based on the organizational dynamics of the NSC, and not necessarily dependent on the 
expansion of the instruments of national power as a primary driver. Although, these four 
challenges directly contribute to the friction associated with the expansion of instruments 
of national power, because as the departments and agencies project core instrument 
capability the NSC has to ensure that it is equitably aligned towards national security 
objectives.  
Challenges Presented by the Expansion of DIMEFIL 
The expansion of the instruments of national power adds additional challenges to 
the coordinating activity in the NSC because of how the instruments are represented in 
the executive departments and agencies. Representation of the instruments of national 
power in the NSC manifest in two forms, centralized and decentralized. The levels of 
decentralization are dependent on the various departments and agencies that are able to 
project the DIMEFIL capability. Figure 1 shows the general breakdown of DIMEFIL 
capabilities, and their corresponding representation in the NSC.  
The NSC has from its inception been the principal executive council for 
coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives. 
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The National Security Act of 1947 which created the National Security Council states 
that:  
The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the 
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national 
security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and 
agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving 
the national security.62 
 
The National Security Council achieves synchronization and coordination of policy by 
advising the President of policy options and integrating all agency level policies.63 The 
NSC does not make department or agency policy nor does it make final decisions on 
national security strategy, it is an advisory council that is charged with ensuring that the 
executive agencies policies are nested with the national strategy and advises the President 
on “policy formulation, oversight of policy implementation, and policy 
implementation.”64  
The structure of the NSC does not by statute give equal equity among the 
departments and agencies that represent the instruments of national power. Through an 
analysis of the structure of the NSC overlaid with DIMEFIL equities demonstrates which 
instruments of national power are centralized under one department and which are spread 
across several departments and agencies. The oldest instruments represented by the 
Department of State and the Department of Defense have statute member status for 
example, and the more nascent instruments are advisory or non-statute members.  
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  The NSC as a whole consists of four levels of committee: The National Security 
Council, The Principal Committee, the Deputy Committee and the Interagency Policy 
Committee.65 The executive branch agencies are the principal mechanism for articulating 
current policy and establishing policy options within each of the hierarchical 
committees.66 Within the National Security Council hierarchy, each instrument of 
national power is not evenly represented across the DIMEFIL spectrum. For instance, 
within the National Security Council the statutory members are: “The President, Vice 
President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Energy”67  The 
Obama administration, for instance, included non-statutory members to include: 
“Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, the Assistant to 
the President and Chief of Staff (Chief of Staff to the President), and the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor). The Director of 
National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [are included] 
statutory advisers to the NSC.”68  The Principal Committee has the same membership as 
the NSC minus the President and is chaired by the National Security Advisor.69  
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  The Deputy Committee is comprised of deputy level leadership among the 
represented agencies in the Principal Committee.70 The Deputy Committee is identified 
as being highly influential to the process of coordinating national security policy. Wilcox 
notes: “The NSC [Deputy Committee] remains a lynchpin in the national security policy 
and execution process.”71 But, within the higher echelon committees within the NSC the 
information power is unrepresented and economic power is largely non-statute members 
and decentralized across several departments. Financial and law enforcement powers are 
represented by non-statute members and the intelligence power is represented by an 
advisory member. Therefore, the make-up of the council is not organized with equal 
equity against the spectrum of power projection capabilities. 
The interagency policy committee is the base echelon of committees within the 
NSC. It is broken into regional and functional policy groups charged with close policy 
coordination of either regional or functional issues.72 The Interagency Policy Committee 
does the bulk of the analysis as Presidential Policy Directive -1 states:  
Management of the development and implementation of national security policies 
by multiple agencies of the United States Government shall be accomplished by 
the NSC Interagency Policy Committees (NSC/IPCs). The NSC/IPCs shall be the 
main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. 
They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior 
committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by 
the President.73 
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When national security policy consideration requires representation from beyond the 
statutory and non-statutory agencies, the committees can include required 
representation.74 Presidential Policy Directive -1 is not aligned towards a one-to-one 
representation across the DIMEFIL instruments of national power. For instance, there is 
not a single executive agency for the instrument of information. That authority used to 
fall on the United States Information Agency (USIA), as the principal agency for 
controlling strategic communication but it was dissolved in 1999.75 The instrument of 
information is now decentralized among many federal agencies housed in the State 
Department, Department of Defense, and virtually every agency that interfaces with the 
foreign media or foreign audiences. Information as an instrument of power is vastly 
decentralized. Other instruments within the DIMEFIL spectrum are aligned with a high 
degree of fidelity. For instance, the State Department represents the totality of American 
diplomatic strength and is a statute member of the NSC with representation within each 
committee in the NSC hierarchy. The Interagency Policy Committee conducts the 
required analysis. The Deputy Committee prepares decisions for the Principal Committee 
and the Principal Committee decides what decisions go to the President for decision. 
Ultimately, the President aided by the National Security Council makes the decisions.  
Within this structure, representation of the instruments of national power in the 
NSC manifest in two forms: centralized representation and decentralized representation. 
Diplomatic instruments of power are directly represented by the Department of State in 
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concert with United States Agency for International Development by statute.76 
Additionally, the military instrument is directly represented by the Department of 
Defense which is the primary entity for planning, coordinating and executing military 
power by statute.77 These two instruments are the totality of centralized representation, 
the rest of the instruments of national power in the DIMEFIL spectrum are decentralized 
across a number of executive branch agencies with representation inside or outside the 
NSC. The instruments that are coordinated outside the NSC, imply a lesser degree of 
coordination within these instruments of power. 
The intelligence instrument has an advisory role within the NSC, with authorities 
resting with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as the lead intelligence advisor to 
the council.78 Although the DNI is the lead for intelligence policy, the Intelligence 
Community is decentralized across an enterprise of executive agencies with mission 
tasking authority for their respective subordinate intelligence agency.79 Richard Best 
explains the contention with the authorities of the Director of National Intelligence as the 
senior executive representing the intelligence community and the intelligence instrument.  
While the DNI’s authorities are stronger than those that were available to the 
[Director of Central Intelligence], whether they are sufficient to implement the 
2004 intelligence reforms mandated by Congress, it has been argued, will 
continue to depend on several factors, including the degree to which the 
authorities themselves are adequate, the DNI’s willingness to assert those 
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authorities, and the extent to which the DNI receives presidential and 
congressional support.80 
 
The primary authorities granted to the DNI in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 gave the position power over personnel, budgeting and tasking 
authority for intelligence assets. But there are limitations to the authority for tasking 
intelligence assets. The DNI was “authorized to exercise certain collection authorities, 
statutory authorities did not explicitly address analysis, production, and dissemination 
authorities.”81 Therefore the DNI coordinated the projection of intelligence assets by 
prioritizing national collection requirements. The remaining departments and agencies of 
the IC have therefore a lot of latitude to direct intelligence operations in support of 
department and agency objectives. Intelligence within the NSC is one of the more 
decentralized instruments of national power.  
The law enforcement instrument is a decentralized instrument as well and within 
the NSC it is represented by both the Justice Department and Homeland Security which 
are non-statute members of the NSC.82 The technical nuances among the array of law 
enforcement disciplines is vast. Each federal law enforcement agency projects a law 
enforcement sub-discipline abroad.  
Each agency brings its own “comparative advantage” to support the law 
enforcement instrument of national power. For example, no federal law 
enforcement agency is better at investigating threats to the homeland than the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, while the U.S. Secret Service is the premier 
protective agency in the world. And the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration is 
                                                          
80 Best, Richard. “Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals.” 
Congressional Research Service. December 2011. Summary. Web: 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34231.pdf 
81 Ibid., P. 8. 




a model for domestic and international counter-narcotics operations. Individually 
and collectively, these and other U.S. law enforcement agencies make powerful 
contributions to protecting the United States’ enduring interests.83 
 
Coordinating such a wide array of different law enforcement capabilities among two of 
the main federal agencies that are capable of projecting core capability demonstrates the 
decentralized nature of the instrument.  
The financial instrument is centralized to a degree because it is represented by the 
United States Treasury, which is a non-statute member of the NSC.84 But, it has 
decentralized vehicles to project power abroad. The decentralized nature of the financial 
instrument is based on aspects of the financial powers that are tied to organizations both 
inside the NSC and outside the NSC and the executive branch to include outside entities 
such as the World Trade Organization and The International Monetary Fund.85  
The economic instrument is a decentralized instrument represented by a multitude 
of organizations that can bring economic forces to bear in support of national security 
objectives. Of the decentralized instruments, economic power falls on the complex end of 
the decentralized spectrum. Economic Policy is formulated and coordinated in the 
Economic Policy Committee which is separate from the National Security Council.86 
Some of the agencies and organizations that can direct economic power are: “Department 
of Commerce, Department of Treasury, [Department of State] and the Export-Import 
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Bank.”87 Additionally, economic power can be projected using non-government agencies 
and the private sector.88 In fact, economic policy is directly tied by domestic market 
forces and domestic market demands. 
Lastly, the information instrument is infinitely decentralized. When the USIA was 
dissolved, the NSC diminished central control of the information instrument. The realities 
of the information environment have added such a large degree of complexity to the 
information instrument that centralized control in the NSC may not be possible. Kozloski 
notes: “Unlike the other three instruments of national power, diplomacy, military and 
economic, there is no single department chartered to deal specifically with 
information.”89  
  The DIMEFIL instruments of national power vary widely in terms of control 
within the executive agencies charged with projecting the respective power. As the NSC 
seeks to focus national power across the DIMEFIL spectrum, the coordination required 
becomes increasingly complex as it involves coordinating policy among agencies with 
direct control of power to agencies with decentralized control of power, and the most 
complex when involving agencies and organizations which are controlled outside the 
NSC. Coordinating the instruments of national power to meet national security objectives 
becomes functionally more complex as certain instruments are spread over multiple 
agencies with direct authority for their employment.  
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 This chapter demonstrates that the expansion of the instruments of national power 
add a level of complexity to the coordination of national security strategy. The structure 
and function of the NSC was originally designed to coordinate diplomatic and military 
instruments of national power. The statute members are directed by the National Security 
act of 1947 to coordinate efforts in the National Security Council. The rest of the 
instruments of national power are represented by various agencies that attend in the 
manner that is directed by the President of the United States. Not all agencies are the sole 
representative of the respective instrument. The instruments of power are retained in 
either a centralized or decentralized manner or represented by organizations that are 
outside the scope of the NSC. The capability of the NSC to synchronize agency policy is 
also affected by longstanding impediments. The bureaucratic nature of the NSC, the over 
reliance on the military instrument of national power, parochialism within the executive 
agencies, and the NSC’s fixation on crisis management vice policy synchronization all 
exacerbate the coordination of executive policy within the NSC. As financial, intelligence 
and law enforcement instruments have become distinctly required to formulate effective 









Chapter 3: Challenges to Coordinating DIMEFIL in Congress 
Congress plays a distinct role in the coordination of instruments against national 
security objectives. Congress coordinates national strategy by authorizing department and 
agency programs and through the appropriation of funding. One of the more critical 
functions that Congress executes to ensure the effective coordination of the instruments 
of power is oversight. Through oversight activities Congress determines the effectiveness 
of department and agency coordination of strategy and determines which programs are in 
keeping with the authorities bestowed upon them by Congress, which programs are 
redundant and which programs are effective. Ultimately Congress is responsible for 
building capability and capacity among the instruments of national power within the 
executive departments and agencies. Without a firm understanding of the requirement to 
coordinate strategy and the requirements of the agencies to carry out strategy, Congress 
cannot build capability.  
This chapter presents the third key finding, which is that the expansion of the 
instruments of national power have presented distinct challenges to developing and 
executing national strategy in the congressional branch because of committee 
jurisdictional limits on action in the authorization, appropriation and oversight process. 
Much like the National Security Council, the congressional committee system, the 
budgeting and oversight process, and committee jurisdictional limits were originally 
designed to build capability and capacity among instruments of national power that are 
centralized in one executive agency like the Department of Defense and the State 
Department. In this system Congress builds capability and capacity with little emphasis 
on integrated capability, because the executive branch focuses the integration of 
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capability in strategy. But as the instruments have expanded, they are also reliant on 
integrated capability and capacity. Congress’s ability to build capability and capacity to 
achieve national objectives is then challenged by its own internal organizational structure 
and process. Jurisdictional limits present challenges to coordinating instruments because 
instruments are developed without systematic consideration of integrated capability and 
capacity.   
There are two distinct factors that limit Congress’s ability to synchronize the 
instruments of national power against national security objectives. The first factor 
involves jurisdictional challenges inherent in the committee structure. The second factor 
is an over reliance on unresponsive budgeting processes that does not validate 
authorizations or appropriations in a coordinated manner commensurate to a 
synchronized national security strategy. This chapter identifies where jurisdictional 
challenges and congressional action in budgeting detract from synchronization of the 
instruments of national power to the National Security Strategy. This chapter begins with 
congressional process. The budget is one of the primary mechanisms Congress has in 
shaping national strategy. Through an examination of the committee system and the 
budgeting process, this chapter will identify how synchronization of the instruments of 
national power occur and where challenges exist.  
Similar to Chapter 2, this chapter identifies existing challenges to coordination 
through literature review. These three challenges that the literature review identifies 
establishes a baseline in evaluating the ability of Congress to build coordinated capability 
and capacity in order to affect strategy among the instruments of national power. These 
three challenges are the contentious nature between the executive and the congressional 
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branch, challenges to congressional committee jurisdiction and challenges to oversight. 
These challenges all affect the ability to coordinate the development of capability and 
capacity within the executive departments and agencies. These challenges become 
exacerbated when evaluating individual DIMEFIL instruments because of how they are 
distributed throughout various committees. The decentralized nature of the intelligence 
instrument and the law enforcement instrument specifically challenge congress’ ability to 
build coordinated capability and capacity.  
Existing Challenges to Coordinating National Strategy in the Congressional Branch.  
Congress is subject to challenges in the conduct of coordinating national strategy 
that are independent from the expansion of the instruments of national power. The 
existential challenges are prevalent throughout many different sectors of congressional 
activity, but are crucial to understanding the nature of friction when national security 
policy is formulated in Congress. There are three primary challenges that relate to 
Congress’s ability to formulate national strategy. The first challenge is the separation of 
powers and the dynamic between the executive and the congressional branch when 
formulating power projection capability. The second challenge is the manner in which 
congressional jurisdiction limits the holistic scope of congressional activity. The third is 
the role of oversight as a tool to ensure the effective implementation of national strategy. 
An understanding of existing challenges is critical to establishing a starting point to then 
further examine how the expanding instruments of national power challenge 
congressional structure, budgeting and oversight of executive branch in affecting national 
security strategy.  
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The Nature of Power Between the Congressional and the Executive Branch. The 
Federalist papers detail the dynamic nature of tensions between the executive branch and 
the congressional branch.  They outline the foundational concepts relating to government 
control of national security by detailing the nature of the relationship between the 
executive and the congressional branch.  Hamilton states, “The interior structure of the 
government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the 
means of keeping each other in their proper places.”90 The tensions, inefficiencies and 
power struggles, as identified by the framers of the constitution, were designed to protect 
the democracy from congealing power in a single branch. The friction built into the 
bicameral legislature and the executive branch present significant challenges to 
synchronizing policy and ensuring its effective and efficient execution. But, that friction 
is a critical element as it protects against national power being solely controlled by any 
branch.  
Geiorge and Rishkof echo this foundational sentiment when explaining the 
contemporary political environment stating, “[t]hat the enduring struggle between the 
legislative and executive branches is turbulent and partisan is to be expected. The 
competing interests clash by design: it is the American way.”91 The theme of friction is 
important in the discussion on Congress and national security. As the framers identify, 
political friction in the national security process is a critical safeguard, but there is a 
threshold where the friction transcends utility and detracts from effective governance. 
Friction and inefficiency are implied, necessary and expected. Although friction is 
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present, Congress still has to overcome the challenges to meet the requirements of its 
mandate to conduct effective budgeting and oversight critical to the execution of national 
security strategy. Congress must navigate internal discourse and the enduring struggle 
between the executive and the legislature and political agendas to build and facilitate a 
coordinated power projection capability. 
  To build power projection capability, Congress relies on oversight as a primary 
tool to control the national security agenda. Walter Oleszek states in his book 
“Congressional Procedures,” that congressional committees “hold executive officials 
accountable for the implementation of delegated authority.”92 Congress uses oversight to 
ensure that the departments and agencies are adhering to constraints and restraints 
outlined in a host of legally binding directives aimed at both the office of the President 
and the executive departments and agencies. Oleszek outlines that the authorities granted 
to Congress in legislative power, fiscal oversight, and investigative responsibilities ensure 
that Congress has the ability to check executive action for a range of purposes critical to 
achieving effective governance.93 Oleszek states that:  
Each of the three overlapping types of oversight – legislative, fiscal, and 
investigative – aims to fulfill the basic goals or purposes of oversight such as 
clarifying statutory intent; evaluating program administration and performance; 
eliminating waste, fraud and abuse and red tape; reviewing whether programs 
have outlived their usefulness; ensuring that new programs and agencies are 
administered in a cost effective and economical manner; and correcting executive 
abuses of authority.94 
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The overlapping types of oversight that Congress uses to steer national security activity 
achieve a disproportionally small effect compared to the executive branch authorities in 
steering national security policy.95 The National Security Council coordinates the 
national security policy and delivers the National Security Strategy to Congress for 
consideration to better understand the overarching strategy and to contextualize the 
resourcing requirements for federal departments and agencies. Congress uses oversight to 
discover issues and uses the budgeting process to ensure that the executive branch has the 
delegated authorities and funding to execute the National Security Strategy.96 The 
primary vehicle for ensuring that the executive branch departments and agencies are 
adhering to the strategy and delegated authorities is through effective oversight 
mechanisms.  
The disparity between the power of the Presidency and Congress in contemporary 
national security tips much of the initiative and authority to the executive branch. The 
National Security Council and the departments and agencies create the national strategy 
and agency strategy. Congress tends to be reactive to the initiative of the executive. But 
current trends were not always indicative of congressional hold on power. President 
Gerald Ford wrote that, “On some occasions in our Nation's history, the legislative 
branch became much more powerful on a day to day basis than the executive branch. On 
the other occasions, the pendulum swung quite the opposite and the executive branch 
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became infinitely more powerful than the legislature.”97 President Ford notes in his 
explanation of the dynamics of power sharing that the executive branch tends to act with 
less congressional involvement in times of imminent threats to national security because: 
“After all, a global war could not be waged with [535] members of the House and the 
Senate deciding what ought to be done militarily, diplomatically, or otherwise.”98 The 
executive branch develops the National Security Strategy, Congress authorizes and funds 
the national security strategy and that forms the basis of the distribution of power 
between the executive and congressional branch. Congress works through committees 
and the executive works through a hierarchical system with the preponderance of 
authorities congealed among a few decision makers.  
Congress’s tempo in matters of national security is therefore much slower and 
subjected to decision by committee. From inception it was designed to be contentious as 
Hamilton outlines in Federalist 51. But, the friction that is built into the process is not 
only acceptable, but critical, as Oleszek describes in his book Congressional Procedures 
and the Policy Process. The friction implied in sharing power between the executive and 
congressional branch is not a static phenomenon. As President Ford observed, during 
different periods in history, power and authorities will ebb and flow between the two 
branches of government. These notions are critical when establishing a baseline on what 
effective oversight is, given the turbulent nature of politics in the federal government, this 
concept invalidates any notion of government being broken because friction exists. 
Congress navigates the inherent friction and uses its legislative, budgetary and oversight 
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authorities to ensure that an acceptable delegation of authorities are granted to the 
executive branch followed by funding. Congress achieves this understanding of what 
needs to be done through effective oversight. 
Jurisdiction Challenges. A Council on Foreign Relations report by Kay King 
titled, “Congress and National Security,” states that Congress ensures that the department 
and agencies are executing within the confines of delegated authorities and funding.99 
The committees and sub-committees, which conduct executive branch oversight, are 
issue focused and honed in on specific items pertaining to their jurisdiction and are not 
structured to coordinate cross jurisdictional matters easily. Kay King’s report calls out the 
structure of the committee system in Congress as misaligned to meet its oversight 
requirements. 
One shortcoming that all the national security committees share is their outdated 
structure. Designed during the Cold War era and updated little since then, the 
committees that handle foreign policy, defense, and intelligence in both chambers 
are not organized to adequately address the fast-paced, cross-jurisdictional issues 
of the world today.100 
 
Ornstein and Mann compliments Kings observations, in an article titled “When Congress 
Checks Out.” They describe how even within narrow jurisdictional limits the ability of 
Congress to implement effective oversight to shape national security policy is minimal: 
“Congressional oversight of the executive across a range of policies, but especially on 
foreign and national security policy, has virtually collapsed…. With little or no 
midcourse corrections in decision-making and implementation, policy has been largely 
                                                          
99 King, Kay, “Congress and National Security,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2010, P. 15, Web: 
https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2010/11/Congress_CSR58.pdf 
100 Ibid.  
56 
 
adrift.”101 Clinton, Lewis and Slein, complement both King and Ornstein and Mann 
positions by noting that numerous committees have equity in national security oversight 
because Congress is issue focused, vise aligned by department or agency in the executive 
branch. This causes a great diffusion of authority across the committees, compared to the 
linear and hierarchical alignment of the executive branch. Clinton, Lewis and Slein 
explain the misalignment a degree further, stating that in an effort to exert more influence 
across a misaligned structure, Congress has made itself weaker:    
Analyzing variation in political influence across and within agencies reveals that 
Congress is less influential relative to the White House when more committees 
are involved. While increasing the number of involved committees may maximize 
the electoral benefits for members, it may also undercut the ability of Congress as 
an institution to collectively respond to the actions of the presidency or the 
bureaucracy.102 
 
The way that Congress aligns its committee system and the volume of committees 
described by Clinton, Lewis and Slein share similar resemblance to Kay Kings assertion 
that the committee system itself is aligned to an antiquated system focused on 
Department of Defense and the State Department as the primary instruments of national 
power projection.  
Oleszek explains that the complexity of the national security issues complicates 
the implementation strategy which causes additional friction. For instance, as intelligence 
requirements grow to support the other expanded instruments of national power, the 
complexity of subject matter and its touch points throughout the national security 
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enterprise put a lot of responsibility on the associated committees to understand very 
complex problems and appropriately authorize, resource and evaluate departments and 
agencies across the spectrum of intelligence capabilities. This is an immensely large and 
detailed undertaking and there is even more restriction on information sharing due to 
classified information. Oleszek points out: 
Some policy areas are also harder for Congress to oversee. Intelligence and 
national security issues are prime examples. Congress must conduct most of its 
intelligence oversight in secret, and the lawmakers who serve on the intelligence 
committees are subject to an array of restrictions that inhibit the disclosure of 
sensitive material even to their colleagues, let alone to the media.103  
 
The other instruments of national power are not aligned to one congressional committee. 
With expertise at a premium and the complexity of issues specific to each instrument of 
power increasing the pressure on the committee system and the requirement of members 
of Congress and staff to have a deep understanding of national security becomes greater 
in order to be effective in required legislative activities.  
Oversight of National Security Policy. Oversight involves the authorities and 
mechanisms that Congress maintains to hold the executive branch accountable. 
Rosenbach and Pertiz observe that: “Oversight is the responsibility of the legislative 
branch to monitor and indirectly supervise federal programs, agencies, and policies. This 
authority is rooted in the Constitution's ‘necessary and proper’ clause and the ‘implied 
powers’ of Congress.”104 Quantifying a definitive metric on what effective oversight is 
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may prove to be difficult. Auerswald and Campbell explain: “Oversight is not easy to 
quantify because it is a ubiquitous activity that is subsumed in many hearings, meetings, 
and informal settings whose purposes may be secondary to reviewing program and policy 
administration.”105 Oversight is the activity that the congressional committees take in 
ensuring that the executive branch is adhering to the authorities that have been granted to 
it by Congress, additionally it is the activity associated with reviewing budget proposals 
to determine efficacy of executive capability and capacity.  Strand, Johnson and Climer 
detail the primary challenge with congressional oversight: “The Congress is, by nature, 
reactive rather than proactive. It reacts to public pressures, to the media, to the interest 
groups, to national emergencies, even to business left unfinished by the previous 
Congress.”106 So therefore, effective oversight can achieve its functions while 
experiencing any form of friction be it organizational, political or informational. It is a 
matter of clearly articulating ways means and ends, and turning what needs to be done 
into action. But it is susceptible to forces that control the agenda. Politically charged 
agenda items have a tendency to draw more congressional oversight than agenda items 
related to strategy or strategic planning.  
The challenges of separation of powers, jurisdiction and oversight on Congress 
illustrates some of the existing friction encountered when building core capability for 
executive execution. The friction that Congress encounters relates to the unity of effort 
among the executive branch and the level in which Congress can exert influence over the 
executive. Committee jurisdictional challenges further dilute authority because power is 
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not congealed in one committee, several committees though both houses of Congress 
share jurisdiction, diffusing power among many bodies. Additionally, jurisdictional limits 
keep committee focus scoped to confined limits. Lastly oversight, as a mechanism to 
drive accountability and ensure the efficacy of executive programs, is subject to the limits 
of jurisdiction and the agenda of oversight tends to be reactive to political pressures that 
prioritize other matters over agency coordination. These challenges articulate the 
organizational challenges that relate to congressional action coordinating national 
strategy. As the expansion of instruments of national power have broadened the power 
projection capability across several executive departments and agencies, it has added an 
additional set of challenges to building capability in a coordinated way. The decentralized 
control of national security instruments across a range of committees has put stress on the 
effectiveness of the committee system.  
Congressional Process and the Expansion of DIMEFIL. 
Congress plays a critical role in the synchronization of national power towards 
national security objectives. Congress is responsible for authorizing government 
programs and apportioning funding to build capability. Additionally, Congress 
determines where the instruments of national power manifest in the federal government 
departments and agencies. Through effective oversight, Congress seeks to understand the 
requirements that shape the development of the instruments of national power. Oversight 
also plays a critical role to help lawmakers hold the executive branch accountable in the 
execution of delegated authorities. As the security environment changes Congress plays a 
critical role in determining how capability is built commensurate to the threat. The first 
segment will examine how Congress is affected by coordination challenges. The second 
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segment will examine how the budgeting process influences national strategy. The two 
segments demonstrate how the distributed nature of DIMEFIL instruments across several 
departments and agencies challenges the ability of congress to build coordinated 
capabilities.   
Challenges to Coordinating DIMEFIL Instruments.   
Congress’s critical function in the development of strategy is authorizing 
programs and providing resources to build DIMEFIL capability and capacity. 
Congressional control of the instruments of national power fall on several committees 
and sub-committees in both the House and Senate. There are standing committees 
charged with authorizing programs, appropriating committees which determine 
department and agency spending and budget committees that determine overall spending 
and revenues, and all have a role in determining capability and capacity of the 
instruments of national power.107 Additionally, standing and appropriating committees in 
both the House and the Senate have the responsibility to ensure that the departments and 
agencies are adhering to the authorizing and budgeting bills once signed into law through 
congressional oversight.108 Through determining what programs are authorized and 
funded, Congress determines the mix of DIMEFIL capability the executive branch 
departments and agencies will receive. By authorizing programs and appropriating funds 
for the entirety of power projection capability, Congress determines where core capability 
exits within the departments and agencies.  
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Over time the operational environment has become more complex. Instruments of 
power have expanded. Congress has kept pace with the evolving security environment 
adding new instruments to provide the right mix to achieve national security objectives. 
With the growing complexity of the security environment, there has been a greater 
requirement for more integrated capability, requiring departments and agencies to 
synchronize the core capability in the projection of power to achieve national security 
objectives. This in turn places greater emphasis on Congress to build capability and 
capacity among the departments and agencies in a coordinated manner among other 
congressional jurisdictions, ensuring the right programs are in the right place. But 
committee coordination is limited by jurisdictional challenges, and there is little that 
directs cross jurisdictional coordination. As rule X of the House of Representatives states:  
In developing its plan each committee shall, to the maximum extent feasible— 
consult with other committees that have jurisdiction over the same or related laws, 
programs, or agencies within its jurisdiction with the objective of ensuring 
maximum coordination and cooperation among committees when conducting 
reviews of such laws, programs, or agencies and include in its plan an explanation 
of steps that have been or will be taken to ensure such coordination and 
cooperation.109 
 
The Senate has no distinct rule granting or emphasizing coordination authority, but it 
does outline specific jurisdictional bounds for each committee.110 To effectively 
synchronize the instruments of national power, Congress must be able to understand 
holistic requirements and capabilities and how they should be represented in the 
departments and agencies. Capabilities must be cross leveled in their development 
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towards strategic ends. This will put challenges on the jurisdictional bounds of the 
committee structure to conduct coordinated committee oversight to determine the right 
mix of authorizations and appropriations of each DIMEFIL instrument. 
 
Building DIMEFIL Capability and Capacity 
In order to understand the congressional budgeting process that builds capability 
for the National Security Strategy, it is important to understand the nature of authorities 
in the process of congressional funding and oversight of the national security strategy. 
Both houses of Congress perform a critical function in setting the national security 
interests, and ensuring that the government has the means to secure those interests. Much 
of the emphasis in developing national security strategy is placed on the executive 
branch. But, the executive branch does not conceive, develop and execute national 
strategy solely within the confines of its authorities. Through both executive and 
congressional branch processes, the federal government develops, prioritizes, funds, 
executes, and oversees national security strategy.  
The executive branch through the National Security Council establishes the 
National Security Strategy. Then, through the President’s Budget the executive branch 
delivers to Congress a proposed cost to programs that it projects will achieve all 
executive functions of government.111 Congress then authorizes each individual program 
by creating authorization bills that go to the executive branch for signature into law.112 
The authorizations create a framework for what is to be funded. The funding bills are 
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created by Congress as appropriations bills and signed into law by the President.113 
Armed with authorizations and funding the executive departments and agencies can carry 
out their mandated functions.114 Congress then ensures that the authorizations and 
appropriations are being carried out appropriately by congressional oversight. Through a 
periodic review of agency and department authorizations and appropriations, Congress 
links strategy and budgeting to build DIMEFIL capability.  
The executive branch creates the National Security Strategy as a guiding 
document to articulate national interests, national security goals, and objectives in order 
to align executive agencies’ subordinate strategies; simultaneously, the National Security 
Strategy also informs Congress of the executive branch’s national strategy.115 Congress’s 
central role in the process is validating the strategy through authorizing agency programs, 
appropriating funds, and overseeing the agency’s execution.116 The process of developing 
a strategy, authorizing the programs, and appropriating funds that occurs between the 
executive and congressional branch is understood in terms of ends, ways and means as 
Robert Worley notes: 
A strategy links ends, ways, and means. That is, the ends of a strategy are the 
objectives or goals to be achieved, the means include the multitude of resources 
devoted to achievement of those objectives, and the ways are the methods of 
organizing and employing those resources to achieve national objectives. Ways 
are the heart of strategy formulation.117 
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Ends, ways, and means are central pillars in formulating strategy. They highlight the 
importance of congressional attention on the role of authorizations and appropriations in 
the formulation and influence of national strategy.  
The National Security Strategy is delivered on the same day the executive branch 
submits its budget to Congress and 150 days after a new president assumes the office.118 
The budget process follows a basic framework executed annually: 
1.  Preparation and submission of the budget by the President to Congress. 
2.  Congressional review of the President’s budget and action required on 
budgetary matters. 
3.  Execution of budget-related laws by federal departments and agencies. 
4.  Audits of agency spending. 119 
Steps two and four represent a large preponderance of the control that Congress has over 
the development of national security.120 Congress has two critical tools it uses to 
synchronize the national strategy: authorizations and appropriations. The National 
Security Strategy and department strategies in this step play an important role as they 
inform Congress of the national security objectives and department plans and gives 
context for the following budgeting process to assist in congressional decision making.121 
Congress first authorizes executive agencies and departments to conduct programs by 
passing authorization bills that first grant the legal authority for activities within each 
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agency.122 Then Congress funds agency programs through appropriation bills, which can 
take the form of: “(1) annual, also called regular or general; (2) supplemental, to address 
unexpected contingencies, such as emergency funding for natural disasters; and (3) 
continuing, often called continuing resolutions (CRs), to provide stop gap funding for 
agencies that did not receive an annual appropriation by the start of the fiscal year.”123 Of 
the 12 regular budgets authorized and appropriated by Congress, four have a direct 
correlation to national security: Commerce, Justice, Science; Defense; Homeland 
Security; State and Foreign Operations.124 The remaining eight regular budgets may have 
components that tie into national security strategy but not to the degree of the major stake 
holding budgets. Linking strategic ends with ways, or department and agency programs 
and capability with funding requires that Congress authorize and appropriate funds with 
an understanding of how it ties together holistically to ensure that duplication of effort 
and misaligned resourcing does not occur.  
Challenges to Coordination 
 There are challenges that occur in the authorization and appropriation process. 
One challenge is the fact that Congress cannot fund coordinated capability for every 
contingency. There are limits to aggregate congressional spending.125 Congressional 
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authorizations further define what the departments and agencies may receive funding for. 
Congressional appropriations continue to narrow strategic capability to the limits of 
available funding. When the budget is signed into law, the national security means 
become finite, which in turn scopes ends and ways. All contingencies and capabilities 
that fell outside of budgeting remain conceptual and are considered acceptable risk in 
their absence. Schanzer, Eyerman and de Rugy summarize the challenge of the budgeting 
process and risk as it pertains to providing capability.  
On the one hand, we face large scale risks of successful attacks causing 
catastrophic damage, but on the other, the government and our political leaders 
feel responsible for taking “every possible measure” to protect the public. In a 
world of constrained resources, however, choices must be made and much 
potential harm must be left unaddressed. Deciding how much of our societal 
resources to dedicate to [national] security and how to allocate those resources 
across the myriad of [national] security domains is an exceptionally difficult 
public policy problem.126 
 
Through each step of the congressional budget process, congressional budgeting 
committees, standing committees, and appropriating committees iteratively scope 
capability based on resources available. This emphasizes the importance of congressional 
responsiveness to authorizations. As the national strategies and objectives change, 
Congress must keep pace with the authorized programs to terminate outdated department 
and agency programs and authorize new programs to respond to evolving threats.  
Congress mitigates the risk of unauthorized or unappropriated contingencies by 
allowing the use of Overseas Contingency Operations /Global War on Terrorism 
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Funding. This funding gives discretionary funding to the State Department and 
Department of Defense to fund certain contingencies that fall within prescribed 
guidelines and outside of authorized and appropriated budgets.127 
Another challenge is the inherent complexity of congressional control of the budget, and 
how the committee systems are aligned towards executive branch agencies. Dale, 
Sarafino and Towell state in a 2013 Congressional Research Service report that, “The 
current system does not budget for national security in an explicit and bounded way. 
There is no legal definition stating how “national security” maps onto any of the sets of 
boundaries used in the current budget process—including executive branch agencies, 
appropriations subcommittees, or budget functions.”128 Multiple executive agencies 
report to multiple committees with differing authorities, and there is no clear alignment of 
national security equity among congressional committees. The decentralization of 
national security authorities among the various committees funds the national security 
enterprise from the bottom up. Each committee steers the executive agencies in a non-
synchronized approach, ardently adhering to the limits of its jurisdiction with less 
attention to holistic prioritization and operational significance. As Dale, Sarafino and 
Towell further state the current congressional system focused more on “ensuring the 
internal consistency of each agency’s budget request than at reconciling the requests of 
various agencies.129 The authorization appropriation process does little to look how 
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division of labor within national security instruments is apportioned within executive 
agencies.130   
Conclusion 
Congressional control of the synchronization of the DIMEFIL instruments relies 
heavily on the committee system to conduct detailed analysis of the requirements to build 
power projection capability. The committees are focused on jurisdictional requirements 
and there is less emphasis on cross jurisdictional coordination to synchronize 
authorizations and appropriations. Understanding how to build diplomatic capability 
depends on the strength of the other instruments. The budgeting process is by its nature a 
synchronizing event because it apportions finite resources based on prioritization of 
needs. Congress has the ability to be responsive to the threat environment and department 
and agency requirements by evaluation and passing twelve authorization and 
appropriations bills. On the other end of the responsiveness spectrum is continuing 
resolutions, which apportion funding to fill limited gaps. Committee jurisdictional 
challenges and unresponsive budgeting limit the ability of Congress to synchronize the 
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Chapter 4:  Case Study: Counterterrorism Strategies and Applications.  
This Chapter demonstrates through case study that the budgeting cycle and 
jurisdictional limits of congressional oversight limit the development of coordinated 
DIMEFIL capability in Congress.  This case example examines the congressional role in 
the synchronization of national power in order to combat terrorism as it became a 
significant threat to national security, requiring a coordinated effort among the many 
instruments of national power after September 11th 2001. This chapter will also examine 
the rise of ISIL during 114th legislative session (2015 – 2016) and the subsequent 
congressional action through budgeting and oversight that highlights how the budgeting 
process degraded the capability to execute national strategy.  
The United States shifted its focus from combating al Qaeda, as the eminent 
asymmetric threat, to including the defeat of the Islamic State terrorist organization to the 
objectives critical to national security. Congress analyzed the threat and understood the 
direction that needed to be taken to synchronize resources against a new counterterrorism 
effort. The lessons learned from the 9/11 Commission Report detailed recommendations 
to better achieve its national security objectives. This case study details how Congress 
reacted to the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations to shore up coordinated power 
projection capability as well as Congress’s reaction to rise of a new asymmetric threat. 
This case study highlights how congressional challenges in jurisdiction, committee 
oversight and the budgeting process limited its ability to effectively synchronize the 
instruments of national power.  
Congress in the Post 9/11 Era.  
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Counterterrorism became a central theme in National Security Strategy after the 
9/11 attacks. In turn, the organization of Congress and its management and oversight of 
the execution of national strategy was examined and adjusted to better ensure the 
instruments of national power could be harnessed and projected to safeguard America’s 
interest at home and abroad. Congress, in the wake of the terrorist attacks, promulgated 
two significant reorganizations within government that were signed into law as a result of 
the demand to reorganize and synchronize the instruments of national power. The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 centralized many of the federal law enforcement 
agencies under one cabinet position: the Director of Homeland Security.131 The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the Director of 
National Intelligence within the executive branch and centralized a number of authorities 
that were previously distributed throughout the IC, namely the authority to establish 
intelligence community budgeting and policy.132 Congressional action was focused in this 
time period on analyzing the structure of government and what instruments of national 
power needed to be further synchronized within the executive branch in order to establish 
and execute an effective counterterrorism strategy and minimize gaps in intelligence and 
law enforcement synchronization with the other instruments of national power. 
The 9/11 Commission Report was one of the primary documents analyzing 
necessary governmental reforms to safeguard against future attacks. After the September 
11th 2001 attack on the United States, Congress mandated that a report be conducted to 
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determine how a terrorist organization was able to attack the United States with such 
devastating effects. The result of the commissions finding were delivered in July of 
2004.133 The 9/11 Commission Report highlighted the significance of synchronizing the 
instruments of national power in both the congressional and executive branch, 
specifically when formulating a counterterrorism strategy. The 9/11 Commission Report 
stated: 
We need to design a balanced strategy for the long haul, to attack terrorists and 
prevent their ranks from swelling while at the same time protecting our country 
against future attacks. We have been forced to think about the way our 
government is organized. The massive departments and agencies that prevailed in 
the great struggles of the twentieth century must work together in new ways, so 
that all the instruments of national power can be combined. Congress needs 
dramatic change as well to strengthen oversight and focus accountability.134 
 
The report highlighted the fact that the executive branch had a tremendously large 
capability to project an effective counterterrorism strategy, yet it was not synchronized 
and the result was several independent actions not aligned towards a whole. The same 
was noted of Congress. The committee system was focused on specific programmatic 
aspects of the executive agencies and departments in the budgeting and oversight 
processes with less emphasis on synchronization across committees when exercising 
congressional control of national strategy.  
The 9/11 Commission Report called out specific recommendations that Congress 
needed to address in order to better focus the legislative functions on national security. 
The theme of the segment titled “Unity of Effort in Congress” details inefficiencies 
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centered on the intelligence instrument of national power and how its control and 
synchronization are mismanaged through congressional action in the committee system, 
stating:  
Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be 
among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by 
current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will 
not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, 
and capable congressional committee structure to give America’s national 
intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership.135  
 
The direct recommendation to Congress was to strengthen intelligence oversight through 
a joint committee or single committees in the House and Senate and grant them both 
authorization and appropriating authorities.136 The 9/11 Commission Report also 
recommended that the intelligence committees have a separate subcommittee focused 
exclusively on oversight and is “freed from the consuming responsibility of working on 
the budget.”137 In an effort to better synchronize the other instruments of national power 
with the intelligence instrument, the 9/11 Commission Report recommended that 
Congress ensure that committee members from the “Armed Services, Judiciary, Foreign 
Affairs, and the Defense Appropriations subcommittee” are included as members of the 
intelligence committees.138 These notions of centralizing authority to the intelligence 
instrument in Congress, as well as an overall focus on better synchronization of the 
instruments of national power, were expressed by the report to be instrumental in shoring 
up congressional function in development and management of national security in 
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Congress. Creating cross committee membership was seen as an effort to synchronize the 
intelligence capability with other instruments of power.  
The result was some forward progress in Congress as the committee structure was 
aligned towards jurisdictional control of the newly formed Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI). This change made some 
steps towards the centralization of law enforcement and intelligence, and enabled modest 
gains towards more comprehensive control of the two elements in the execution of 
national security strategy in both the executive and the congressional branch. After the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004, the executive branch had more instruments aligned in cabinet positions, but 
Congress had to follow suit. Previously, the law enforcement and intelligence instruments 
were federated among many agencies, and the authorizations of programs and 
appropriation of funds were even more distributed in Congress before the establishment 
of the DNI and DHS in the executive and the respective committee’s in Congress.  
In 2002, Congress began to reorganize the committee structure to reflect the new 
DHS executive structure. The House established the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security to establish committee jurisdiction over the newly created DHS in the executive 
branch.139 The Select Committee on Homeland Security would be elevated to a standing 
committee in 2005.140 In the Senate, the current Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Senate Committee established jurisdiction over DHS in 2003, to ensure “primary 
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oversight of the creation and subsequent policies, operations, and actions” of DHS.141 
But, synchronization within instruments was not complete across the evolving law 
enforcement instrument. For instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
remained part of the Justice Department and additionally, the FBI is one of the 17 
members of the Intelligence Community with some overlapping policies established by 
the DNI and outside the jurisdiction of the DHS aligned committees.142  
The consolidation of intelligence instruments through the creation of the DNI in 
the executive branch saw little commensurate consolidation within the intelligence 
instrument in the congressional branch. The recommendations expressed in the 9/11 
Commission Report for consolidation of power in either a joint intelligence committee or 
greater oversight authorities in existing House and Senate committees gained little 
traction in the years after the 9/11 report. Several attempts were made in Congress to 
centralize authorities in both houses’ congressional committees. The most significant 
attempts to reform the intelligence committees’ ability to conduct oversight of executive 
intelligence functions included legislative attempts to: 
1.  Clarify and expand the authority of the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) over the intelligence community (IC), particularly the CIA.  
2. Add a new statutory inspector general (IG) to encompass the whole IC.  
3, Create new statutory IGs for certain Defense Department intelligence agencies.  
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4. Increase coordination and strengthen reporting among the relevant offices of 
inspector general. 
5. Change IC congressional notification and reporting requirements.143 
None of these changes were enacted. Any bill strengthening congressional control of the 
budgeting process or oversight of any intelligence function beyond what was currently in 
place in the 2001 to 2010 timeframe was going to receive a Presidential veto, because it 
sought to bolster congressional authority over the executive branch.144 The post 
September 11th period of reforms remained minimal for the intelligence committees in 
the House and Senate and the authorities of intelligence budgeting concentrated to a 
degree in the DNI, but oversight remained widely distributed across the various other 
stake holding standing committees. Kiaser and Halchin noted in a Congressional 
Research Service Report in 2012 that:  
Most of the jurisdiction of the current Intelligence Committees is shared. The 
select committees hold exclusive authorizing and legislative powers only for the 
CIA, the DNI (as it had over the now-defunct Director of Central Intelligence), 
and the National Foreign Intelligence Program. This leaves the intelligence 
components in the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and 
Treasury, among other agencies, and intelligence-related programs to be shared 
with appropriate standing committees.145  
 
After the 9/11 Commission Report, the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence did not incorporate nearly 
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any of the recommendations that enabled a more comprehensive system of controls for 
the intelligence instrument beyond jurisdiction over the newly created DNI.  
 Congressional reforms to control the instruments of national power in the years 
after the 9/11 Commission Report recommendations were minimal. The committee 
structure and jurisdictional limitations reinforced a system in Congress where committees 
were largely limited to influencing only specific initiatives within each instrument and 
confined to committee jurisdiction. Although the 9/11 Commission Report had detailed 
the importance of synchronization across the array of the instruments of national power, 
little traction was made to institute substantive measures to control the cross-committee 
coordination, beyond ensuring the certain committee members were included in the 
make-up of other committees. This stagnation in Congress to enact essential reforms was 
identified in a 2008 Project on National Security Reform report as a primary obstacle in 
the effective synchronization of the instruments of national power in the execution of 
national security strategy: 
Congress focuses almost exclusively on department and agency capabilities 
instead of what might be particularly relevant to multi-agency activities. 
Similarly, administration submissions of agency budgets do not focus on 
interagency missions, nor do they even typically note these requirements. This 
contrasts sharply with agency-specific needs, which are routinely highlighted in 
congressional testimony and which are noted as shortfalls in the president's 
budget. Congress has no clearly assigned venue for oversight for the 
“interagency” space. The appropriations committees could theoretically take a 
whole-of-government approach to multi-agency activities, but they typically act 
with a subcommittee focus. Congress spends enormous amounts of time and 
effort considering the performance of the individual agencies and departments, 
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but not broader national security missions more generally nor interagency efforts 
in particular.146 
 
Years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States and after several comprehensive 
reviews of Congress’ ability to effectively lead the national security effort on the hill 
have signaled very consistent themes. The committee structure did adjust to DHS 
requirements but did not align overall law enforcement powers and it did not adjust to the 
requirement for interagency synchronization. The congressional control of intelligence 
did make some modest gains in terms of mandating some intelligence sharing, but it did 
not enact the bulk of what the 9/11 Commission Report suggested. This continued the 
congressional budgeting and oversight focus of myopic initiatives within each committee. 
In terms of synchronization, the congressional committee system, in an effort to provide 
congressional influence, presented challenges to the oversight of coordinated capability 
of each instrument by congealing jurisdiction in a stove pipe and this offered little roads 
to synchronization with other instruments of national power.  
Congress and the Growing Threat of Islamic State  
In January of 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence received the 
Worldwide Threat Assessment by the Director of National Intelligence James Clapper 
which described deteriorating conditions in Iraq and Syria, based on a growing capacity 
of Sunni terrorist organizations and the marginalization of Sunni ethnic groups in the 
Iraqi Government.147 In June of 2014, turbulence in the region would cascade into further 
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instability as the Islamic State terrorist organization declared its caliphate over much of 
the Muslim world.148 The following 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment, delivered to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, assessed the newly created Islamic State as a 
definitive threat to the United States homeland and its interests abroad. The Worldwide 
Threat Assessment described an elevated threat stemming from the Sunni extremist 
organization:  
Although most homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) will probably continue to 
aspire to travel overseas, particularly to Syria and Iraq, they will probably remain 
the most likely Sunni violent extremist threat to the US homeland because of their 
immediate and direct access. Some might have been inspired by calls by the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in late September for individual 
jihadists in the West to retaliate for US-led airstrikes on ISIL. Attacks by lone 
actors are among the most difficult to warn about because they offer few or no 
signatures.149 
 
Congressional leadership all understood that counterterrorism efforts needed to shift 
focus to the Islamic State terrorist organization if the United States was going to protect 
its interests both domestically and abroad. The echoes of previous discourse emphasizing 
the importance of synchronization of DIMEFIL instruments in Congress would be 
muffled by the vast deliberative mechanisms and routine process in place in 
congressional government. 
In the 114th legislative session, there was a considerable amount of effort 
surrounding the issue of counterterrorism and interagency coordination. There were 111 
Congressional Committee Reports and 181 proceedings entered into the congressional 
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record relating to terrorism and interagency coordination.150 This resulted in 118 
proposed pieces of legislation related to counterterrorism, of which 16 became law. What 
is not represented in the statistical snapshot is the inordinate amount of oversight activity 
that occurred at the individual member and staff level that cannot be quantified. With the 
growing threat of the Islamic State on the rise, the congressional leadership understood 
what issues Congress faced in the 114th legislative session. Senator McCain expressed as 
he addressed the Center for Strategic and International Studies on his top priorities for the 
Senate Armed Service Committee:   
We face a rising threat from violent Islamist radicals that seek to erase borders, 
topple governments, and foment sectarian civil war. These terrorists and militants 
now control more territory in the Middle East than ever, and their reach is 
spreading deeper into Muslim communities in Africa and South Asia. The result 
is that a key strategic region of the world is descending into despotism, violence, 
and chaos. While some may wish to minimize America’s exposure to crises like 
this, history teaches us that we are ultimately unable to do so. In the face of these 
threats, our goal must be to shore up the liberal world order. We recognize, of 
course, that this cannot be done through military force alone. We must use all 
elements of our national power, including our economic, diplomatic, moral 
influence. But acknowledging that there is no military solution, which is a truism, 
should not lead us to believe that there is no military dimension to the problem—
or that hard power can play no role in a favorable solution. In fact, our soft power 
is the shadow cast by our hard power. That is how we deter adversaries, reassure 
allies, defeat enemies, and add leverage to our diplomacy.151 
 
The 114th Congress understood the threat. Additionally, the 114th Congress knew that 
through the synchronization of DIMEFIL capability the United States could protect its 
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interests at home and abroad. In February of 2015, The President delivered the National 
Security Strategy to Congress which outlined the greater emphasis on DIMEFIL power 
projection as the foundation of its strategy to defeat the Islamic State.152 The National 
Security Strategy even eluded to the dwindling military capability in the Middle East 
region following the drawdown of forces.153 This signaled to Congress that emphasis 
towards oversight of department and agency capability would be a critical function as the 
military instrument would not be projected to the degree it had been in the previous 
decade to combat terrorism.  
In the House, the declared oversight plans articulated a sturdy understanding of 
the requirements Congress faced in synchronizing the instruments of national power 
against the growing threat. The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
relayed the emphasis for its oversight plan:  
The Committee will conduct oversight of U.S. diplomatic, military, and 
development efforts to address the issue of global terrorism both in the short-term 
and long-term. The Committee’s oversight will include whether the United States 
is maximizing the use of all elements of the national security power and how anti-
terror efforts, such as the detention and trial of unlawful enemy combatants, are 
coordinated with other important U.S. national security interests and the rule of 
law. The Committee’s review will include the international standing of the United 
States, humanitarian assistance, development programs, and public diplomacy 
efforts.” 154  
 
In the other standing committees representing DIMEFIL equities, the emphasis for 
oversight relayed the importance of ensuring that the authorizations and appropriations 
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were streamlined to maximize individual instrument capability. For instance, the House 
Justice Committee, in its oversight plan for the 114th Congress noted:  
The Committee will also conduct oversight of all agencies and programs within 
its jurisdiction to uncover waste, fraud, or abuse and to identify programs that are 
inefficient, duplicative, or outdated, or that are more appropriately administered 
by State or local governments. 155 
 
Linking oversight to tangible action in the budgeting process was articulated in the 
Committee on Homeland Security as well. “the Committee will work to identify potential 
opportunities to eliminate duplicative or unnecessary programs, find efficiencies that will 
contribute to the Department’s ability to meet its vital missions.”156 Congress’ sights 
were set on ensuring that effective oversight was honed in on ensuring that the right 
capabilities existed in the departments and agencies. Congress, according to their 
oversight plans, would hone in on executive department and agency programs to 
determine if adjustments would need to occur. Congress would examine which programs 
were to be authorized and examine funding levels for each program within the executive 
department and agencies to ensure that the right mix if DIMEFIL capability existed to 
project national power against the growing terrorist threat.  
Intent did not match action for the 114th Congress. Although a considerable 
amount of bills were introduced and only a small fraction became law, much of the 114th 
legislative effort was focused on House and Senate Armed Services Committee passing 
the National Defense Authorization Act. Restrictions on discretionary spending 
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established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 meant that the House and Senate would 
cut the defense budget, which ultimately led to a presidential veto.157 Both the House and 
Senate had to rework the budget and with the assistance of the Bipartisan Budget Control 
Act of 2015, the House and Senate were able to increase the funding levels of the 
National Defense Authorization Act and have it signed into law in November 2015. The 
effect was that the DoD paid for base budget items with money that was allocated for 
Overseas Contingency Operations which reduced spending for specific counterterrorism 
efforts to include war-related appropriations and the counterterrorism partnership fund.158  
Conclusion 
The congressional effort in the 114th Congress to synchronize the instruments of 
national power did not produce any substantial results beyond the passing of the National 
Defense Authorization Act. For the other major stake holding committees representing 
DIMEFIL capability, they did not receive new authorizations in 2015. The Department of 
State’s last authorization, at the time, was signed into law was in 2003.159 The Justice 
Department’s last authorization was in 2009.160 The 114th Congress failed to pass the 
Intelligence Authorization Act, it cleared the House but did not pass the Senate.161 Of the 
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federal government’s discretionary spending for 2015, 29.5% was spent on unauthorized 
programs.162 The effect of the unauthorized spending is that a comprehensive review of 
the spending plan to meet counterterrorism objectives was not completed as advertised by 
Congress in their priorities for oversight. Authorizations for spending for the executive 
departments and agencies were disjointed and reflect priorities as far back twelve years 
from the 114th legislative session. To add a further degree of friction to the 
synchronization of the instruments of national power the 114th Congress introduced a 
continuing resolution Omnibus Appropriations Bill for 2016.163 This furthered the 
degradation of oversight capability of Congress to deliberate the spending plan for 
national security equities. A Congressional Research Service report in 2016 noted: 
In addition to the customary concern of sacrificing the opportunity for debate and 
amendment for greater legislative efficiency that arises whenever complex 
legislation is considered under time constraints, the use of omnibus appropriations 
acts has generated controversy for other reasons. These include whether adequate 
consideration was given to regular appropriations acts prior to their incorporation 
into omnibus appropriations legislation, the use of across the board rescissions, 
and the inclusion of significant legislative (rather than funding) provisions.164 
 
The 114th legislative session had the authorities to review the authorizations and 
appropriations for executive branch departments and agencies. The budgeting process 
gives Congress the mechanisms to reevaluate DIMEFIL capability and build 
comprehensive national power commensurate to the threat to achieve national objectives. 
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When Congress forgoes authorizations, and passes omnibus or continuing resolution 
appropriation bills it represents the minimum ability to be reactive to issues facing 
national security.  
 The impact that this has on DIMEFIL capability is it creates strategic gaps. If 
congress does not evaluate strategy and determine department and agency capability 
commensurate to the requirements then it runs the risk of funding and appropriating 
departments and agencies independent of strategy objectives. The responsibility of 
funding is then deferred to the executive branch and an over reliance on Overseas 
Contingency Operations funding to fill normative spending requirements rises.  
 If strategy is incumbent on integration, then DIMEFIL development through 
appropriation and budgeting and oversight should be integral to determining overall 
ability to achieve strategic ends. An example of strategic gaps caused by lack of cross 
coordination can also be seen in the 2011 to 2015 budgets, in the time period that saw the 
rise of the Islamic State. In 2011, there was an inevitable void that was created by the 
drawdown of military forces in Iraq. Many of the efforts that were led by the Department 
of Defense fell on the State Department after the transition. Around the same time frame, 
the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism was published and it articulated the need 
for integrated DIMEFIL capability along with congressional evaluation of power 
projection capability. 165  The strategy stated that, “this strategy integrates the capabilities 
and authorities of each department and agency, ensuring that the right tools are applied at 
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the right time to the right situation.”166 The military withdrawal from Iraq set the 
conditions for a terrorism threat that would place emphasis on integration of DIMEFIL 
capability absent the lead of the DoD.   
The void that the military left put the requirement on the State Department to see 
the national strategy through to its desired ends in Iraq. A 2011 Congressional Research 
Service report on State Department funding notes that there were doubts on the, “State 
Department’s capacity to take over more than 300 activities—ranging from 
environmental cleanup to medical support—that the U.S. military had been 
performing.”167 The roll of oversight at this critical juncture should have been focused on 
the ability of the state department to achieve policy objectives.  The House Foreign 
Affairs committee conducted three hearings on the transition of authority to the State 
Department.168 Many policy experts were called, but only one member of the DoD 
attended during the hearing.169 The theme in the testimony was that there was an 
“unprecedented level of coordination between the DoD and State Department in 
preparation for the transition, and the proposed budget reflects the ability of the State 
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Department to successfully transition and ensure stability in Iraq.170 In the hearings, there 
is only reference to diplomatic, military and law enforcement capabilities with no real 
evaluation of other instruments in the execution of strategic objectives. The minimal 
oversight of federal governments activities can be attributed to the jurisdictional scope of 
the House Foreign Affairs committee. The committee is charged with overseeing the 
State and DoD foreign activities, not the holistic application of strategies as it applies to 
overall US objectives.  
The budgeting action in this time period also reduced the State Department 
funding and subjected the budgeting cycle to several continuing resolutions that further 
limited congressional oversight and control. The State Department Foreign Operations 
budget was reduced from $35.3 billion in the 2010 budget to $33.8 billion in 2011 
budget.171 Additionally, spending remained relatively flat until the 2015 time frame when 
the foreign operations budget was raised to $36.93 billion.172 State Department spending 
in Iraq fell proportionally from $9 billion in 2010 to $ 5 billion in 2011 amid the 
drawdown of military forces in Iraq.173 The strategic gap in this instance was a reduction 
in State Department power projection capability in concert with a Department of Defense 
drawdown. This was in large part due to the Budget Control Act which set limits on 
overall spending. The appropriations and budget cycle reduced power projection 
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capability at a critical period that caused cuts to critical programs within the state 
department that directly affected the ability of the State Department to achieve its 
objectives.174   
Although there are a multitude of factors that set the conditions for the Islamic 
State to gain influence in Iraq during this timeframe, the US presence was not capable of 
addressing the conditions that led to the expansion of the terrorist threat. Little was done 
through congressional oversight to evaluate the coordinated capability of DIMEFIL 
instruments to achieve national objectives. Ultimately congressional action reduced the 
State Departments Foreign Operations spending in Iraq at a critical juncture. Oversight in 
this instance did focus on the programmatic specifics of DIMEFIL capability which 
ultimately produced a gap that necessitated the redeployment of military powers to 
achieve strategic ends.  
The DIMEFIL power projection capability should be evaluated on a regular 
schedule commensurate the detail provided in the guiding strategic documents. Oversight 
on department and agency programs is not focused towards strategic ends. Spending bills 
are lumped together and passed without the degree of fidelity commensurate to twelve 
separate regular appropriation bills. Congress has the capability and understands the need 
to synchronize the instruments of national power. Congress has studied the problem 
associated with synchronization and understands the requirements. Jurisdictional 
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challenges in the committee structure and the ineffective budgeting process detract from 
























This thesis portfolio presents an approach to understanding the challenges 
involved with coordinating the DIMEFIL instruments in both the executive and 
congressional branch of government. The expansion of the instruments of national over 
time has allowed the United States to project distinct capability across the DIMEFIL 
spectrum to secure the nation’s interest. This expansion has challenged the organization 
and structure of both the executive and congressional branches of government as it seeks 
to build capability and capacity and seeks to project coordinated power to achieve 
national security objectives. There is a wealth of existing scholarship that details 
normative challenges in both the executive and congressional branch in the formulation 
of coordinated strategy, but what this thesis portfolio adds to the topic is an examination 
of the challenges to coordinating strategy from the perspective of DIMEFIL elements of 
power projection and how they manifest in government. This portfolio theorizes that the 
growth in the instruments of national power has led to a degree of decentralized control 
among the newer additions to the list of instruments that affect the ability to coordinate 
strategy in the executive and congressional branches of government. 
The key point discovered in the first chapter is that the instruments of national 
power, which represent the capabilities the US uses to project power abroad, have grown 
over time to include a broader range of distinct powers.  In order to illustrate this point, 
the first chapter examines the growth of the instruments of national power from pre-
WWII to contemporary times. The concept of instruments of national power have 
expanded to what is known today as DIMEFIL instruments of national power. These 
instruments manifest in the departments and agencies in either a centralized or 
90 
 
decentralized manner. The military and diplomatic powers are centralized institutions, in 
that they are represented by one federal department each. The newer additions to the 
DIMEFIL spectrum, specifically intelligence and law enforcement are decentralized, 
because they are controlled by many different departments and agencies. This framework 
for analysis identifies challenges that affect coordinated strategy.  
The second chapter details challenges to effective coordination in the National 
Security Council. The key finding articulated in this chapter details how existing friction 
points to developing national security strategy manifest. The bureaucratic nature of the 
NSC, the over reliance on the DoD, parochialism among the federal agencies, and the 
tendency to weigh crisis management over deliberate planning all challenge the 
coordination of the instruments of national power against national security objectives. 
The decentralized nature of law enforcement and intelligence instruments further 
challenges existing friction points because effective strategy then requires a larger degree 
of coordination among departments and agencies that share power projection capability.   
The third chapter makes a similar claim but is focused on the congressional 
branch which by design is a lager deliberative body than the National Security Council 
and is subject to its own distinct challenges when creating capability and capacity for 
power projection. The key finding that this chapter presents is that the contentious 
relationship Congress has with the executive, jurisdiction of committees and effective 
congressional budgeting and oversight all present challenges to affecting coordinated 
strategy. The expansion of the instruments of national power to include distinct 
DIMEFIL core capabilities further challenges the existing friction points, primarily 
because instrumental core capability exists across several departments and agencies and 
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in turn are spread across an even further range of congressional committees. This presents 
challenges when developing core capability and executing essential oversight to 
determine obsolete and redundant programs.  
The fourth chapter presents a case study that showcases the reforms that were 
suggested by the 9/11 Commission Report as it identified the challenges to effective 
synchronization along the range of instruments of national power. The case study 
analyzes the reform in the intelligence and law enforcement instruments as the DNI and 
DHS were created to provide a more coordinated effort in strategy and power projection. 
Although many reforms were proposed, minimal changes were made. The second part of 
the case study examines the rise of ISIL which signaled much of the same asymmetric 
threat that necessitated a well-coordinated effort similar to the conditions examined in the 
9/11 Commission Report. Many of the committees stressed effective oversight and an 
examination of power projection capability, but minimal congressional action occurred in 
that session of Congress which was evidenced by nonexistent authorization bills, and an 
omnibus spending bill that validated pre-ISIL spending during the rise of a significant 
threat to national security. This case study shows how the authorization and 
appropriations process, committee jurisdiction and oversight present challenges to the 
coordination of power projection capability.  
Coordinated strategy is essential to power projection. Synchronization among the 
executive agencies enables the United States to project the totality of DIMEFIL 
capability against the multitude of national security objectives in a manner that optimizes 
limited resources. A United States Government Accountability Office statement on 
interagency collaboration states: “National security threats have evolved and require 
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involvement beyond the traditional agencies of DOD, the Department of State, and 
USAID. The Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, Justice, the Treasury, 
Agriculture, Commerce, and Health and Human Services are now a bigger part of the 
equation. What has not yet evolved are the mechanisms that agencies use to coordinate 
national security activities such as developing overarching strategies to guide planning 
and execution of missions, or sharing and integrating national security information across 
agencies.”175 The efficiencies of synchronization are predicated on the economical 
distribution of DIMEFIL instrument projection. Effective synchronization starts at the 
top. Agencies working in concert through policy synchronization, driven by the NSC, as 
well as the elimination of redundancies or inefficiencies within the DIMEFIL instruments 
will provide cohesive strategy advantages. Krugler compliments this theory as he notes: 
“To maximize their influence and effectiveness, [instruments of national power] are best 
viewed as members of a team, each of which has a specialized role to play in a coherent 
approach that blends their unique roles.”176 As the financial, intelligence and law 
enforcement instruments of national power increase in projection capability, the National 
Security Council will have to make a greater effort in coordinating DIMEFIL instruments 
in order to maximize the effectiveness of national power against national security 
objectives.177 
Utility of Portfolio 
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Much of the existing scholarship on the subject of national security relates to the 
political environment that shapes the formulation of national strategy or it examines the 
nature of power projection as it relates to the complexities of the operational 
environment. This portfolio contributes to the topic of national strategy, force 
development, and power projection by providing a detailed examination of the nature of 
national strategy as it exists and relates to core capability at the executive and 
congressional level. The friction points identified in both the second and third chapter 
offer a hypothesis on the challenges to strategy as they relate to synchronizing the core 
capabilities of power projection. Examining how the government is structured among the 
executive and congressional branch overlaid with the core power projection capabilities, 
identifies distinct challenges to effective coordination. This portfolio provides utility in 
any further examination of current organizational structure in both the executive and 
congressional branches of government because it identifies weak points that limit 
effective synchronization. This portfolio contributes to the discussion in the Joint 
Professional Military Education’s body of scholarship particularly in the study of the 
instruments of national power. This examination provides insight into how government 
structure affects the ability to project the instruments of national power. Additionally, this 
examination of DIMEFIL instruments against organizational structure aids in 
organizational analysis of existing governmental structure to improve the development of 
national security policy.178 An awareness of the challenges is the first step in planning a 
mitigation strategy. 
                                                          




The outlook for the government’s ability to coordinate the instruments of national 
power towards national security objectives will continue to be subject to existential 
challenges in the executive and congressional branches of government. The 2019 World 
Wide threat assessment sends a clear warning that signals touch points across the range of 
instruments of national power: 
The post-World War II international system is coming under increasing strain 
amid continuing cyber and WMD proliferation threats, competition in space, and 
regional conflicts. Among the disturbing trends are hostile states and actors’ 
intensifying online efforts to influence and interfere with elections here and 
abroad and their use of chemical weapons. Terrorism too will continue to be a top 
threat to US and partner interests worldwide, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The development and 
application of new technologies will introduce both risks and opportunities, and 
the US economy will be challenged by slower global economic growth and 
growing threats to US economic competitiveness.179 
 
As the US national security enterprise is exposed to increasing strain from external 
actors, there will be further strain on the ability to affect a well-coordinated strategy both 
in Congress and the executive branch. Activity against one national objective will have 
second and third order effects on another.  
The instruments of national power have been on a growth trajectory, and as the 
complexities of the operating environment increase, the United States will seek ways to 
project power commensurate to the threat and operating environment. This dynamic 
multi-domain environment will stress the ability of the National Security Council to 
consolidate and coordinate the individual instruments of national power distributed 
among varying authority across several departments and agencies. It will also stress the 
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ability of Congress to effectively ensure the departments and agencies are authorized and 
appropriated in a manner that enables coordinated strategy commensurate to the current 
threat.   
The challenges associated with the growth of the instruments of national power 
will necessitate a focus on DIMEFIL capabilities and coordination in both the executive 
and congressional branches. In the executive branch the interagency policy committee of 
the NSC will have to assess the programmatic specifics of DIMEFIL capability as they 
develop policy and drive subordinate department and agency strategy. The addition of 
finance, intelligence and law enforcement powers adds a level of complexity because 
they have supporting and enabling touch points with all the instruments of power in the 
execution of strategy. Congress will have to address the cross jurisdictional limitations of 
budgeting and oversight. As the capabilities that are developed in departments and 
agencies are integrated with supporting and enabling capabilities outside the 
jurisdictional control of respective congressional committees, holistic oversight will be 
essential to ensuring that budgeting and oversight is focused on effective execution of 



























*USAID is an independent agency that reports to the State Department. 
** Non-Statue Members of NSC the attend when issues are pertinent to their department 
or agency.  
*** The Director of National Intelligence controls overarching policy and sets national 
priorities, but the individual departments and agencies IC are responsible for the direction 
of intelligence operations.   
 
 
Instrument of Power Centralized/Decentralized Department or Agency NSC Membership Status  Representative Relevant Strategies 
Department of State Statute Member Secretary of State Joint Strategic Plan
USAID/ State Department Non Statute Member Secretary of State Joint Strategic Plan
Information Decentralized All Departments and Agencies
Statute Member Secretary of Defense National Defense Strategy
Statute Advisor
Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff
National Military Strategy
National Economic Council Non Statute Member** 
Director of the 
National Economic 
Council 
Economic Report of the 
President 
Department of State Statute Member Secretary of State Joint Strategic Plan
Department of Treasury
Non Statute Regular 
Attendee 
Secretary of the 
Treasury
Treasury Strategic Plan




Department of Commerce Non Statute Member** 
Secretary of 
Commerce
Department of Commerce 
Strategic Plan
Department of Energy Statute Member Secretary of Energy
Departmnet of Energy Strategic 
Plan
Department of Treasury 
Non Statute Regular 
Attendee 
Secretary of the 
Treasury
Treasury Strategic Plan
Department of Homeland 
Security




Department of Homeland Seurity 
Strategic Plan
Intelligence Community Statute Advisor
Director of National 
Intelligence 
National Intelligence Strategy
Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence 
Statute Advisor
Director of National 
Intelligence 
Air Force Intelligence 
Army Intelligence 
Central Intelligence Agency Non Statute Member**
Director of Central 
Intelligence 
Coast Guard Intelligence 
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Energy
Department of Homeland 
Security
Department of State
Department of Treasury 
Drug Enforcement 
Administration 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigations




National Security Agency 
Navy Intelligence 
Department of Defense Statute Member Secretary of Defense Department of Justice Strategic 
Department of Homeland 
Security




Department of Homeland Seurity 
Strategic Plan
Department of Justice
Non Statute Regular 
Attendee 
Attorney General
Departmnet of Justice Strategic 
Plan
Department of Treasury
Non Statute Regular 
Attendee 
Secretary of the 
Treasury
Treasury Strategic Plan
Law Enforcement Decentralized 
Centralized* 
National Intelligence Strategy***
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